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LONDON CALLING: DOES THE U.K.’S EXPERIENCE WITH 
INDIVIDUAL TAXATION CLASH WITH THE U.S.’S 
EXPECTATIONS? 
STEPHANIE HUNTER MCMAHON* 
ABSTRACT 
The United States is one of the last countries to tax married couples jointly; 
most other countries have adopted individual taxation.  In 1990, the United 
Kingdom completed transitioning its tax system from one that treated husbands 
and wives as a marital unit to one that mandates an individual-based system, 
and so it has two decades of experience with the new regime.  This article 
provides American policymakers valuable information regarding the 
consequences of adopting individual taxation by examining the United 
Kingdom’s experience.  First, it establishes a matrix of factors that identifies 
and assesses differences between the two nations that affect the predictive 
value of the United Kingdom’s experience for the United States.  The article 
then reviews the origins and development of the United Kingdom’s original 
mandatory joint return and the forces that drove the change to individual 
taxation.  Finally, it appraises the consequences of this revision of British law, 
including the improved economic position of many wives and the increased 
incidence of tax avoidance.  Comparing the change in the United Kingdom 
with what would likely occur in the United States, this article uses comparative 
taxation to provide a guide for the United States, urging consideration of the 
costs as well as the benefits of changing tax units. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few would dispute that reinventing the wheel is generally a waste of time 
and resources, but Americans often do just that when considering changes to 
fiscal (and other) policies.  While we as a nation sometimes analyze what has 
already been tried in the United States (U.S.), we rarely examine what has been 
undertaken abroad.  This is unfortunate because some reforms currently being 
proposed in the U.S. are similar to those that have already been adopted by 
other countries.  For example, the U.S. is one of the last countries to tax 
married couples as marital units.1  In recent decades there has been a 
worldwide movement, which many American academics join, in favor of 
taxing spouses as individuals as a means of promoting gender equality.2  Most 
 
 1. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 60 (1997). 
 2. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OF PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX 54–56, 114–26 (OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 13, 2006) (discussing the effect of 
an individual-based tax system on OECD member countries); EC Comm’n on Income Taxation 
& Equal Treatment for Men & Women, Memorandum of 14 December 1984 Presented to the EC 
Council, (COM (84) 695 final), reprinted in 39 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 262, 265 
(1985) [hereinafter EC Comm’n on Income Taxation] (noting that taxing individuals rather than 
couples has the most gender-neutral effect); Cathal O’Donoghue & Holly Sutherland, Accounting 
for the Family in European Economic Income Tax Systems, 23 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 565, 567–69 
(1999) (discussing the traditional family model of taxation and its assumption that one spouse is 
financially dependent upon the other).  Among the dozens of articles by American scholars on 
this topic, see generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND 
THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 170–202 (2001) 
(discussing the history of the American system’s rejection of separate tax returns and highlighting 
its gender inequities); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997) (reviewing existing 
proposals and recommending legislative changes to achieve gender neutrality); Boris I. Bittker, 
Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975) (explaining how the 
income tax should change to adapt to changing social norms and ideals); Grace Blumberg, Sexism 
in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. 
L. REV. 49 (1972) (comparing American treatment of dual-earner couples with that of other 
nations); Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the 
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241 (1997) (exploring how income splitting and 
aggregation harm women); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in 
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980) (arguing that a separate return system 
is the best solution for eliminating disparities in tax treatment based on gender and marital status); 
Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple’s Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 27 (1978) (noting separate returns would further feminist goals and solve taxation 
disparities under the joint return system); Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: 
Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259 (1988) (examining how 
income splitting ideas from the 1940s underlie current tax policy); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, 
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS 
L.J. 63 (1993) (noting that women’s choice whether or not to work is affected by the current tax 
structure); James Edward Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching the Horse and the Carriage, 67 
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of the American scholars who agree with this conclusion do so without 
examining the many real world examples of this change in policy that can be 
found outside America’s borders.3 
Advocates of individual taxation expect it to help wives gain greater 
equality within marriage because it eliminates the marriage penalty that results 
from applying progressive tax rates to joint returns.4  When two individuals 
marry and their two incomes are combined for calculating the taxes due, more 
income is pushed into higher tax brackets, producing a larger collective tax 
burden than would be due if the spouses had not married.5  As discussed more 
fully later in this article, this penalty is thought to burden wives more heavily 
than their husbands because wives’ income often is considered secondary to 
the income earned by their mates.6  Eliminating this penalty is expected to 
 
TAX NOTES 539 (1995) (arguing that to eliminate the “marriage penalty” altogether, a separate 
return system must be used); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a 
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977) (arguing for taxing 
individuals based on the benefit they receive from the family income); Shari Motro, A New “I 
Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006) (proposing that 
only couples committed to actual income splitting be allowed to do so for tax purposes); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994) (examining the 
behavioral impact on women of the current joint return structure); Lora Cicconi, Comment, 
Competing Goals Amidst the “Opt-Out” Revolution: An Examination of Gender-Based Tax 
Reform in Light of New Data on Female Labor Supply, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 257 (2006–2007) 
(discussing the U.S. tax structure as an influence on educated women’s decision not to work); 
Wendy Richards, Comment, An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias Perspective: 
It is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 611 (2008) (arguing that 
marriage bias in the tax code negatively affects both spouses and same-sex couples). 
 3. But see Norma Briggs, Individual Income Taxation and Social Benefits in Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and the U.S.A.: A Study of their Interrelationships on Lower-Income Couples 
and Single Heads of Household, 39 BULL. INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 243 (1985) 
(reviewing how the U.K., U.S., and Swedish tax systems treat women); Oliver Oldman & Ralph 
Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons, 12 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1960) 
(examining how various nations tax married couples); Joseph A. Pechman & Gary V. Engelhardt, 
The Income Tax Treatment of the Family: An International Perspective, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 1 
(1990) (examining international efforts to reform taxes to account for family responsibilities); 
Tonya Major Gauff, Comment, Eliminating the Secondary Earner Bias: Lessons from Malaysia, 
the United Kingdom, and Ireland, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 424 (2009) (examining the effects of 
tax reform on dual-earner couples in various countries); Janet G. Stotsky, Gender Bias in Tax 
System (Int’l Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dep’t, Working Paper No. 96/99, 1996) (providing 
examples of countries who have undertaken tax reform to reduce gender bias). 
 4. Leslie A. Whittington, updated by James Alm, Marriage Penalty, in THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX POLICY 251, 252 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2005). 
 5. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 365–66.  On the other hand, couples, generally those with a 
primary earner, enjoy a marriage bonus of lower collective taxes because they benefit from larger 
joint filing tax brackets or larger exemptions.  See id. at 340–41, 364 n.113.  As discussed in Part 
III, some couples also enjoy bonuses with individual tax filing through tax planning. 
 6. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 365.  See also infra Parts II, III.A.i. 
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encourage wives to enter the paid labor market or for higher-income husbands 
to shift property to their lower-income wives, in either case improving wives’ 
economic position within marriage.7 
Before 1970, only six OECD member countries taxed spouses separately 
which, by eliminating the combination of incomes, eliminated these marriage 
penalties.8  The other countries shared the American system of taxing married 
couples as a unit.9  By 1980, seven additional countries had adopted individual 
taxation, and three more did so in 1989 and 1990.10  Because so many 
countries have changed how they tax married couples, there are many 
experiences the U.S. can study as it considers undertaking a similar change in 
policy. 
In 1990, the United Kingdom (U.K.) completed its transition from 
imposing taxes on husbands and wives as a marital unit to taxing each spouse 
as an individual, so it has two decades of experience with the new regime.11  
Although the U.K. ought to be an obvious example for the U.S. if Congress 
decides to change its tax unit, little research has been done in the U.S., or made 
widely available to U.S. legal scholars, on the British transition.12  This article 
fills this gap in knowledge as it evaluates behavioral responses to changing tax 
units, using the U.K. as a case study, and it discusses the implications for the 
U.S. 
While this comparative method of learning from the experiences of one 
nation and applying that knowledge in another is used relatively infrequently 
by scholars, it has been used effectively in policy development.  U.S. and U.K. 
policymakers have both looked across the Atlantic before adopting changes to 
 
 7. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 2, at 89–90; Christian, supra note 2, at 250; Gann, supra 
note 2, at 32–46; Gerzog, supra note 2, 36–37; Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 109–11; Zelenak, 
supra note 2, at 343; Richards, supra note 2, at 649–50. 
 8. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 1, at 59 app.A. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Id. at 59.  Individual taxation is often limited to earnings.  Id.  In 1993, of 27 countries in 
the OECD, 19 countries taxed earned income separately but taxed couples’ investment earnings 
collectively.  Id.  The Czech Republic adopted joint filing in 2005 only for couples with children.  
Jonathan R. Kesselman, Income Splitting and Joint Taxation of Couples: What’s Fair?, IRPP 
CHOICES,  Feb. 2008, at 3, 15. 
 11. Finance Act, 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.).  I have been asked why I did not use Canada as the 
comparison country.  Although Canada has been studied in preparation for this article, it did not 
change tax units and so does not illustrate responses to change. 
 12. Economists have looked at the British transition’s impact on transfers of property within 
the family.  Melvin Stephens Jr. & Jennifer Ward-Batts, The Impact of Separate Taxation on the 
Intra-Household Allocation of Assets: Evidence from the UK, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1989, 1990 
(2004).  See also ANN MUMFORD, TAX POLICY, WOMEN AND THE LAW: UK AND COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 103–56 (2010).  Mumford uses the move to individual taxation as her baseline and 
argues that the subsequent shift to a child-centered system hurts women.  Id. at 109. 
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their tax systems.13  In the future, the U.S. should use this approach in a careful 
and systematic way, focusing not only on what policies other countries have 
tried but also on the intended and unintended consequences of these policies 
and the likelihood of similar results in the U.S.  As discussed in Part I of this 
Article, this type of deep research into a foreign country and its laws requires 
careful attention to the choice of comparison and a clear understanding of its 
limits.  This Article sets forth guidelines for assessing the usefulness of 
international comparisons and what similarities two countries must have for 
the policy experiences of one to offer useful insights to the other. 
With the differences between the two taxing regimes in mind, Part II 
explores how the U.K.’s approach to the tax unit evolved over time.  
Beginning with a discussion of the early development of the British income 
tax, this section examines why Parliament initially adopted a tax system that 
required husbands to file returns and pay taxes for the married couple, what I 
call husband taxation, and only incrementally recognized wives in the tax 
system.  Part II then evaluates how and why the British Parliament adopted 
individual taxation or, as they call it, “independent taxation” in the Finance Act 
of 1988 that took effect in 1990.14  The transition began in 1972 when 
Parliament introduced limited, optional individual taxation, permitting wives to 
file individual returns reporting their earned income and for taxes owed to be 
calculated as though they were single persons.15  In 1988, Parliament went 
further and denied married couples the option to file jointly by adopting 
mandatory individual taxation.16  Part III evaluates the consequences, some of 
which were unintended, of the U.K.’s adoption of individual taxation and 
considers what guidance the British experience can provide American 
 
 13. One of the earliest, and possibly most important, comparative tax works is EDWIN R.A. 
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME 
TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD (2d rev. ed., 1921).  For additional examples of non-academic 
comparative research in the policy context, see, for example, MARTIN DAUNTON, JUST TAXES: 
THE POLITICS OF TAXATION IN BRITAIN, 1914–1979 214–15 (2002); ANN MUMFORD, TAXING 
CULTURE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF TAX COLLECTION LAW 61 (2002); Steven A. Bank, The 
Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, 30 J. CORP. L. 1, 3, 33–34 (2004); Ajay 
K. Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys: The U.S. Treasury, World War I, and the 
Administration of the Modern Fiscal State, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 173, 212–13 (2010).  See also 
infra notes 123–27 and accompanying text. 
 14. Finance Act, 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.).  Individual taxation differs from individual filing.  
Individual taxation calculates and imposes tax on each spouse separately.  Individual filing 
merely requires each spouse to file a separate return and denotes nothing about how the tax is 
calculated.  Therefore, individual taxation could be imposed but allow couples to file jointly 
(saving paper), or the system could allow spouses to file individually but be taxed jointly.  Most 
proponents of individual filing in the U.S. also propose individual taxation. 
 15. See Finance Act, 1971, c. 68, § 23 (Eng.). 
 16. See Finance Act, 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.). 
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policymakers.  In doing so, it examines the incentives and behavioral responses 
created by individual taxation. 
The Article concludes that the effects of the U.K.’s adoption of individual 
taxation should provide a warning to the U.S.  Adopting individual taxation 
has created numerous unintended consequences in the U.K., and U.S. 
policymakers should consider these before changing the tax unit.17  Even if 
adopting individual taxation proves to be the best choice, all of its results, both 
the good and the bad, need to be included in the political calculation.  Looking 
carefully at the British experience with individual taxation can offer American 
policymakers invaluable guidance as they try to predict what the negative 
results will be. 
I.  WHY THE U.K.?  RULES AND REASON 
Professor Mary Ann Glendon once wrote, “To many American lawyers, an 
interest in other legal systems is something like an interest in wines: a little 
knowledge about them is a sign of good taste and sophistication, but a serious 
dedication may be evidence of waste, or luxury, or even worse.”18  This 
attitude is caused by the often limited probative value of comparisons between 
legal systems: Relatively few international comparisons can offer 
policymakers meaningful practical insights into a particular issue.19  Possibly 
for this reason, comparative tax studies often avoid applying concrete, specific 
lessons from one country to another.20  Nevertheless, careful, informed 
comparisons between tax systems can be highly instructive and may even help 
policymakers shape policies that avoid the negative consequences other nations 
have experienced.21 
 
 17. See infra Part III (describing how individual taxation both led to wives’ increased paid 
employment and property ownership and also created significant government policing problems 
due to new forms of tax avoidance). 
 18. Mary Ann Glendon, Why Cross Boundaries?, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 971, 972 (1996). 
 19. See, e.g., Pechman & Engelhardt, supra note 3, at 21–22 (noting that large differences in 
the tax treatment of the family from country to country make it difficult to draw anything but 
general conclusions). 
 20. See, e.g., Louise Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian, 
American, British, French and Swedish Law, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67, 127–28 (1985); 
Pechman & Engelhardt, supra note 3, at 21–22.  But see Edward D. Kleinbard, An American 
Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 41 (2010) (arguing for schedular 
taxation based on evaluation of Nordic countries’ tax systems). 
 21. For a discussion of comparative taxation, see HUGH J. AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2010) (offering comparative analysis of 
different tax structures); MUMFORD, supra note 12 (examining tax collection culture in the U.S. 
and U.K.); VICTOR THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW (2003) (broadly discussing different tax 
structures); William B. Barker, A Comparative Approach to Income Tax Law in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 7 (1996) (comparing the tax evolution in 
the U.S. and U.K.) [hereinafter Barker, Comparative Approach]; William B. Barker, Expanding 
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Policymakers that want to take practical lessons regarding the income tax 
from comparative tax studies need to ensure that they choose a comparison 
nation whose culture, politics, economy, and legal and revenue systems are 
similar to their own in certain fundamental ways.  Although there will never be 
a perfect comparison, in order to be able to assess the likely consequences of a 
specific policy change the comparison should employ countries with key 
factors in common and clearly acknowledge where the countries differ.22  
Thus, broad threshold questions can eliminate many nations from 
consideration.  Is there a genuine rule of law in both countries, and how strong 
are the legal institutions that regulate their income taxes?  What are their 
relative levels of economic development, and are these levels so different that 
one can expect their income tax systems to differ accordingly?  Is one or both 
of the nations constrained by supranational organizations that limit its 
individual sovereignty? 
These threshold questions are easily answered for the nations under 
review.23  Not only was the U.S. originally a colony of the U.K., but even after 
 
the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote Democratic Policy: The Example of the Move to 
Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 703 (2005) 
(arguing that a comparative tax study should not be strictly theoretical but consider the nature of 
legislation); John C. Chommie, Why Neglect Comparative Taxation?, 40 MINN. L. REV. 219 
(1956) (suggesting more avenues for comparative tax studies); Carlo Garbarino, An Evolutionary 
Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 677 
(2009) (discussing methods of comparative taxation); Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics of Tax 
Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 251 (2003) (examining which ethical rules should apply to neutral 
experts when advising developing countries to adopt Western tax structures); Michael A. 
Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv: Reflections on Progressive Taxation 
and “Progressive” Politics in a Globalized but Still Local World, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (2006) 
(undertaking a comparative analysis of the effects of tax progressivity) [hereinafter Livingston, 
From Milan to Mumbai]; Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes 
and Limits of Comparative Tax, 18 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 119 (2005) (exploring the 
potential for comparative tax study and why studies do not already exist); Omri Y. Marian, The 
Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 (2010) (examining existing 
comparative tax scholarship); John Tiley, Judicial Anti-avoidance Doctrines: The US 
Alternatives, 5 BRIT. TAX REV. 180 (1987) (considering introducing British general anti-
avoidance rules to the U.S.). 
 22. I disagree with Watson that “[v]ariations in the political, moral, social and economic 
values which exist between any two societies” make it less worthy of drawing comparisons of 
legal problems.  ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
4–5 (1974).  See also RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 15, 50–52 (6th ed. 
1998) (arguing that legal comparison is a useful method of study).  While this article begins with 
a functionalist approach, one must examine the causes and effects of legal change with a critical 
eye in order to draw normative conclusions about those changes’ consequences. 
 23. See Barker, Comparative Approach, supra note 21, at 8.  However, the U.S. and U.K. 
are not in the same tax family, and some scholars worry about their differing ideological 
approaches.  THURONYI, supra note 21, at 25–29; John Tiley, Judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctrines: 
Corporations and Conclusions, 4 BRIT. TAX REV. 108, 143 (1988). 
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gaining independence, the U.S. maintained legal and cultural ties with Britain.  
Today, the U.K. and the U.S. are both wealthy, industrialized democracies with 
common law backgrounds and robust, effective legal institutions, albeit with 
important differences in their law and politics that will be discussed below.  
Despite the U.K. being a member of the European Union, it retains substantial 
discretion in devising its own tax system as does, of course, the U.S.24  Even 
when the U.K. responds to political pressures exerted by the European 
community, the British government must consider domestic reactions.25  The 
U.S., on the other hand, has a federalist system that is likely to influence the 
effectiveness of changes in federal law as states can respond to national 
changes, as shown, for example, by states’ adoption of community property 
laws to minimize federal taxes.26  Therefore, although the initial threshold 
questions are met, there are important differences between the U.K. and the 
U.S. that need to be considered further. 
Digging deeper, both to determine whether this comparison is genuinely 
worthwhile and to understand its limitations, we must look specifically at the 
American and British income tax systems.  This examination focuses on five 
sets of questions.  First, to what extent are both countries dependent upon the 
revenue generated by the income tax?  The more a nation relies on its income 
tax, the stronger its interest will be in protecting its revenue-raising potential.  
Because the U.S. is reliant upon the income tax as a source of revenue, if the 
comparison country is not similarly dependent upon the income tax, the two 
nations are likely to have different concerns and, consequently, make different 
political choices.27  Like the U.S., the U.K. relies heavily on the income tax, 
although the U.K. raises comparatively more revenue from internal taxes.28  
Despite its value-added tax (VAT), the British income tax fluctuated between 
11.7% and 10.1% of the U.K.’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 39% and 
30.9% of its tax revenue between 1970 and 1990, when most of the legal 
changes under review were adopted.29  In the U.S., if individual taxation were 
 
 24. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, TAX POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (2000). 
 25. As discussed infra 18–20, the U.K. often used European arguments to further purely 
local objectives. 
 26. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Save State Residents: States’ Use of Community 
Property and the Federal System of Government for Tax Reduction, 1939–1947, 27 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 585 (2009). 
 27. FIN. MGMT. SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, 
OUTLAYS, AND BALANCES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 11 (2009), available at 
http://www.fms.treas.gov/annualreport/index.html. 
 28. See FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP’T, INT’L MONETARY FUND, TAX POLICY HANDBOOK 289–94 
(Parthasarathi Shome ed., 1995). 
 29. Id.  By 2005, the income tax in the U.K. was down to 28% of revenue.  OFFICE FOR 
NAT’L STATISTICS, UK 2005: THE OFFICIAL YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT 
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 365 (2004). 
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to be adopted today, the income tax comprises less of American GDP, between 
8% and 10%, but more of the government’s tax revenue, approximately 42%.30  
Clearly, both nations rely on the income tax as a vital source of revenue, and so 
both have a strong incentive to consider carefully how any proposed change to 
the income tax would improve or worsen the tax’s effectiveness. 
The second set of questions relate to the political process of producing tax 
policy, as well as the resulting popular support for that policy.  To what extent 
do each country’s taxpayers and interest groups participate in the political 
dialogue that shapes tax policy?  After policy is made, how aware are people of 
taxation, and how compliant are they in paying the tax?  Despite their shared 
dependency on the tax, there are significant differences between the two 
countries under review in terms of the overall process of tax policy creation 
and the public’s interest and involvement in that process.  Unlike in the U.S., 
where tax policy typically develops in a complex, relatively public negotiation 
process involving both the executive and legislative branches of government, 
British policy development is more closed.31  A substantially final, complete 
policy is designed by the British administration and then voted on (rather than 
negotiated) by Parliament.32  Major British initiatives are often “announced in 
the annual budget speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as, in effect, fait 
accompli.”33  This is changing in the U.K. as policies are more open for debate 
but, compared with the U.S., the British executive retains the power over tax 
policy.34 
Not only does this British practice result in less overt interest group 
pressure on the drafting of tax statutes, it has allowed the British government 
to design a simpler regime than exists in the U.S.35  However, this lesser input 
by interest groups does not mean British taxpayers are more satisfied, or more 
compliant, with the resulting legislation.  In fact, British taxpayers have a 
lower morale about their tax system than do their American counterparts.36  
 
 30. See FIN. MGMT. SERV., supra note 27, at 11; FISCAL AFFAIRS DEP’T, supra note 28, at 
289–94. 
 31. For an example of the U.S.’s process, see Jackie Calmes, Obama Weighing Broad 
Overhaul for Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, at A1 (discussing negotiations between 
Democrats, Republicans, and the President regarding tax changes). 
 32. See DAUNTON, supra note 13, at 18–22; David W. Williams, Taxing Statutes are Taxing 
Statutes: The Interpretation of Revenue Legislation, 41 MOD. L. REV. 404, 405–06 (1978). 
 33. Michael Keen, Peculiar Institutions: A British Perspective on Tax Policy in the United 
States, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 779, 795 (1997). 
 34. Id. at 795–97. 
 35. See MUMFORD, supra note 13, at 117–26.  Although the complexity of the British 
system has increased in recent years, it remains far less complex than the American system. 
 36. B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  212–14 
(1991); James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States 
and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224, 239 fig.2 (2006).  See also MUMFORD, supra note 13, 
at 51 (stating that eliminating ignorance about the British tax system would increase confidence 
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These differences in how the income tax is legislatively modified and how the 
public perceives the tax will affect the value of comparisons between the 
countries.  Throughout this Article, the potential impact of these differences 
will be highlighted. 
Third, in order to judge a comparison of income tax policy, we must ask: 
To what extent do the structure and practical administration of the two income 
taxes differ?  Because this Article focuses on behavioral responses, are the 
differences substantial enough that we should expect similar policies to 
produce different results in practice?  Answering these questions requires 
considering not only the general degree of complexity of the tax codes but also 
far-ranging and very specific details of their operation.  For example, how do 
the countries define income?  Do the variety and purpose of deductions differ?  
And to what extent are the taxes collected at the source of income?  The 
answers to these questions reveal significant differences in the administration 
of the American and British income taxes but ones that can be defined and 
evaluated in the comparison process. 
The U.K. has a schedular system of defining income in which the income 
and deductions from different sources are separately assessed, whereas the 
U.S. uses a global definition that combines all income and deductions in a 
single calculation.37  One consequence that has evolved from these two 
approaches is that the U.K. has a more limited concept of income based on 
specific sources.38  This is distinct from the broader, American concept that 
any realized increase in wealth is taxable income.39  This difference causes the 
U.S. to be more inclusive when taxing income and the U.K. to be more limited 
and formulaic.  Both nations, however, provide favorable tax rates for 
unearned income.  In the U.S., capital gains rates are currently taxed at a 
maximum of 15% and, in the U.K., the comparable rate is 18%.40  Both 
countries, thus, favor some forms of income over others. 
How the nations collect these taxes also differs.  The British system 
developed a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system instead of the American 
withholding and self-assessment regime.41  The PAYE system tells taxpayers 
how much they owe, and it calibrates the amounts withheld over the course of 
 
in the system); William Gale, What Can America Learn from the British Tax System?, 18 FISCAL 
STUD. 341, 351 (1997) (noting the British citizenry’s ignorance of their tax system). 
 37. I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 67–89 (2006); Comment, Some Techniques of Taxation in the United 
Kingdom, 52 YALE L.J. 400, 400–02 (1943). 
 38. See THURONYI, supra note 21, at 236–37. 
 39. Id. at 232, 236. 
 40. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006); Capital Gains Tax Rates and Annual Tax Free Allowances, HM 
REVENUE & CUSTOMS, www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/cgt.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). 
 41. AULT ET AL., supra note 21, at 163.  The U.K. has required more self-assessment since 
1996.  Id.; Gale, supra note 36, at 350; Victoria Curzon Price, The British Tax System: Opposing 
Trends, 13 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES 589, 592 (2003). 
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the taxable year to ensure that refunds or payments, and therefore the filing of 
tax returns, are generally not required.42  Only about 9.3 million people are 
required to file a tax return in the U.K. each year.43  Thus, only about 35% of 
British taxpayers, typically those who are self-employed or who have higher 
incomes or investment income, are required to file income tax returns.44  In the 
U.S., conversely, more than 100% of taxpayers are required to file.45 
The PAYE system works, in large part, because the British income tax is 
simpler than the American system, making self-assessment unnecessary in 
most cases.46  In fact, simplicity in operation is an important policy goal in the 
U.K.; while the U.S. claims to have such a goal, little has been done to achieve 
it.47  There are many fewer deductions and fewer rate brackets in the British 
income tax than in the American tax, and most British taxpayers are in one tax 
bracket, making the system resemble a flat rate tax.48  In 2004, the latest year 
for which data are available, there were an estimated 29.9 million individual 
taxpayers in the U.K., of which only 3.4 million, or 11.4%, were not in the 
20% bracket.49  These structural differences between the U.K. and the U.S. will 
affect the impact of individual taxation, and the impact of these differences 
will be discussed later in this Article. 
Fourth, to what extent does the enforcement of the taxes differ?  Because 
simplicity is an important objective, the British income tax has less-developed 
 
 42. See Gale, supra note 36, at 347–50; Christopher C. Hood, British Tax Structure 
Development as Administrative Adaptation, 18 POL’Y SCI. 3, 14 (1985). 
 43. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 372.  This does not mean the PAYE 
system is always accurate.  One study notes at least 40% of taxpayers have incorrect codings.  
MUMFORD, supra note 13, at 54 n.4. 
 44. See OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 372.  Approximately 17 out of 26 
million British individual taxpayers had no need to file tax returns, and 50% of those who need to 
file a return in the U.K. are self-employed.  William J. Turnier, PAYE as an Alternative to an 
Alternative Tax System, 23 VA. TAX REV. 205, 224 (2003). 
 45. Americans who are not taxpayers have to file income tax returns because the system is 
also used to distribute government aid, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit.  E.g., I.R.C. § 
6012(a) (2006). 
 46. See Gale, supra note 36, at 348. 
 47. DAUNTON, supra note 13, at 360; Gale, supra note 36, at 348–50. 
 48. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 372–73; Gale, supra note 36, at 347–
48.  There are three brackets in the British system, with 20%, 40%, and 50% rates.  Finance Act 
2010, c. 13, § 1 (Eng.).  See also HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, BUDGET 2009: ADDITIONAL RATE 
OF INCOME TAX AND INCOME-RELATED REDUCTION OF THE PERSONAL ALLOWANCE FROM 
2010–11 1 (2009), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2009/bn01.pdf.  There are also 
special rates for savings income or ordinary dividends.  Id. at 2.  Income tax rates in the U.S. are 
much more complex.  I.R.C. § 1 (2006).  The American alternative minimum tax with its flat tax 
features eliminates many of these deductions.  See I.R.C. §§ 67, 68. 
 49. OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 372–73. 
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anti-avoidance procedures than the U.S. has.50  Instead of the common law 
doctrines and broad anti-avoidance legislation and regulations that U.S. 
regulators use to pursue tax avoiders whose actions breach the spirit, but not 
the letter, of the law, the British tax system demands that Parliament clearly 
define the income it wants to tax.51  Therefore, British tax avoidance is largely 
a test of statutory construction and, to a certain extent, form over substance.52  
Taxpayers generally succeed in avoiding taxes if they structure their 
transactions to gain favorable tax treatment under the literal language, if not 
the intent, of the revenue statutes.53  As discussed more fully in Part III, this 
difference in systems will have a definite effect on how effectively the 
government can police avoidance-driven transfers between spouses. 
Finally, to what extent is each nation’s income tax meant to further social 
goals, or goals other than raising revenue?  The U.S. has long incorporated 
social policy goals in its tax code, for example through the adoption of 
numerous deductions and credits that attempt to encourage charitable 
donations, home ownership, secondary education, et cetera.54  While the U.K. 
shares an understanding that the income tax can be used to implement social 
policy, it has never attempted to do so to the extent that the U.S. does.55  
Nevertheless, both nations generally share, and attempt to advance, the larger 
social policy goal of taxing people according to their ability to pay taxes; and 
both seek, within limits, to advance policies meant to achieve the dominant 
political party’s vision of that end.56  For example, the adoption of individual 
taxation in the U.K., as discussed in Part II, was not driven by revenue 
objectives but by social ones of providing financial support to one-earner 
families.57 
The answers to these questions reveal important differences between the 
British and American tax systems in their structure and administration, and 
these differences will make comparisons of the income tax’s tax unit between 
the U.K. and the U.S. less than perfect.  However, these differences are a 
 
 50. HEATHER GETHING ET AL., HERBERT SMITH, GLEISS LUTZ, & STIBBE, A GENERAL 
ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE FOR THE UK—THE FINAL CONFESSION OF GOVERNMENTAL 
INEPTITUDE?  2–4 (2010), available at http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/04BC669D-
20F7-4A4F-94E9-336A6D901397/0/8626_AntiAvoidanceRulebriefing_d4.pdf.  For a discussion 
of how British tax statutes are interpreted, see AULT ET AL., supra note 21, at 167–69, 205–08; 
THURONYI, supra note 21, at 172–84; Caroline Garnham, Finance and the Family: The Pitfalls in 
Tax Planning, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 1993, at 10; Williams, supra note 32, at 408–17. 
 51. AULT ET AL., supra note 21, at 153, 167.  A general anti-avoidance rule was proposed in 
the 1990s but withdrawn.  Id. at 169. 
 52. See id. at 167–69. 
 53. Id. at 166, 169. 
 54. Gale, supra note 36, at 348–49. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
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matter of degree and not kind.  If any comparison has value, these differences 
can be addressed by appropriate sensitivity to how they might affect the 
comparison.  Moreover, for any comparison of a policy to be useful, it is 
important to identify and understand the factors that might cause the 
comparison to produce faulty advice and inaccurate predictions.  Because the 
U.K., but not the U.S., has changed its tax unit to date, this Article addresses 
these questions by focusing on the actual experience in the U.K. and then 
considering the ways in which the U.S. experience would likely differ if it 
enacted a similar change. 
This more narrow analysis of the specific policy must first ask: What were 
the stated goals of the policy change as articulated by both the government and 
various affected interest groups (recognizing that there are likely to be 
inconsistencies between these statements)?  In the context of this article, the 
questions must be reframed to reflect the fact that the U.S. has not yet adopted 
individual taxation: What were the stated goals of the change in the U.K., and 
how would we expect those goals to differ if individual taxation was adopted 
in the U.S.?  As a corollary to these questions, to what extent has the change 
achieved its stated goals? 
Second, what impact has the change had on the operation of, and 
compliance with, the income tax?  Has the change encouraged tax planning 
and tax avoidance?  If a change in law significantly increases administrative 
costs or causes a substantial amount of tax avoidance, those considering a 
similar policy change should weigh that consequence against the change’s 
benefits, both because governments are loath to spend money on tax 
enforcement and because the creation of tax avoidance, particularly to the 
extent it is visible to other taxpayers, might decrease compliance overall.58  If 
there are factors that are likely to cause the administrative and compliance 
effects of a policy change to differ in the two nations under consideration, the 
comparison should identify them and weigh their likely impact. 
Finally, what unintended consequences has the policy been shown to have?  
These consequences can be good or bad; the labels of good or bad themselves 
are socially constructed and, while society can agree on a few goals, many 
more divide the public.  Nonetheless, although different people draw different 
normative conclusions about such consequences, identifying the unintended 
consequences of a policy change is useful when evaluating the overall success 
of the measure.  Included in this group of concerns are the incentive effects of 
a change in policy.  What does the change in legislation cause people to do?  
Although some incentives might be intended, that will not always be the case.  
It should never be assumed that all policymakers and advocates intended to 
create every incentive or even understood them. 
 
 58. See infra Part III.B. 
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The remainder of this Article explores the answers to these questions in the 
case of the U.K.’s adoption of individual taxation and what that experience can 
tell American policymakers about the possible consequences of a similar 
policy change in the U.S.  Although there are reasons to expect that the 
adoption of individual taxation by the U.S. would produce different results 
than it has in the U.K., the purpose of the previous questions is to help us 
predict when behavioral responses are likely to differ between counties.59  This 
is not to suggest such a comparison will produce a perfect predictive guide.  
The effects of any policy change are complex because of the interaction of 
numerous political, social, and economic factors.  Nonetheless, understanding 
the U.K.’s change in its tax unit should help American policymakers anticipate 
the behavioral responses of following in its footsteps. 
II.  THE HOW AND THE WHY OF CHANGE 
The U.K. originally adopted the income tax in the midst of the nation’s 
wars with revolutionary France.60  The tax was intended to raise much needed 
revenue for the war effort at a time when tax administration was rudimentary.61  
Consequently, administration was a significant concern; the tax’s impact on 
wives was not.  This early tax adopted husband taxation to make 
administration easier.62  By requiring husbands to file tax returns reporting not 
only their income but also that of their wives, revenue was more easily raised.  
Through the first century of the tax’s operation, the income tax all but ignored 
the existence of British wives.  It was only gradually that Parliament enacted 
changes that granted wives rights and privileges within the tax system.63  The 
pace of change began to accelerate in the 1970s and 1980s with the result that 
the original system was jettisoned for a mandatory individual regime.64 
 
 59. This is pushing the analysis further than Livingston, who claims that political differences 
will yield “indirect and unpredictable” results.  Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, supra note 
21, at 583. 
 60. MARTIN DAUNTON, TRUSTING LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS OF TAXATION IN BRITAIN, 
1799–1914, at 32–57 (2001).  For good descriptions of the early British income tax, see id. at 32–
57; see generally ARTHUR HOPE-JONES, INCOME TAX IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS (1939); B.E.V. 
SABINE, A HISTORY OF INCOME TAX (1966); Meade Emory, The Early English Income Tax: A 
Heritage for the Contemporary, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 286 (1965). 
 61. SABINE, supra note 60, at 26–27; Emory, supra note 60, at 288–89. 
 62. See ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, SECOND REPORT, 1954, 
[cmd.] 9105, at 36 (U.K.) (noting that the treating husband and wife as one unit was easiest); but 
see Dulude, supra note 20, at 76 (noting the joint tax was instituted because women were thought 
to be servile to men). 
 63. See Dulude, supra note 20, at 76–79. 
 64. Finance Act 1988, c. 39, § 32 (U.K.); Dulude, supra note 20, at 77–79. 
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A. The Early Years 
By the end of the seventeenth century, the House of Commons had taken 
from the king his prerogative of economic regulation.65  New political leaders, 
like Prime Minister William Pitt, held that power largely as a result of their 
financial acumen.66  They were entrusted with the task of raising money even 
as war with France called attention to the incapacities of the British fiscal 
system.67  Earlier revenue measures’ susceptibility to evasion and their general 
unreliability forced Pitt to propose a new tax levied directly on income.68  A 
significant concern for those drafting this income tax was how to minimize its 
avoidance.69  They recognized that there would always be some avoidance and 
evasion, but they sought to confine the abuse within reasonable limits.70  As a 
result, when, in 1798, they imposed a tax on a person’s entire income, the 
person was not every individual but every non-married person and every 
husband.71  Families were not to be a means of tax avoidance; couples were 
prohibited from reducing their taxes through the shifting of income to a lower-
taxed spouse.72 
Husband taxation was also a natural choice of tax units because it 
“afforded a convenient means of collecting the tax, more especially as the 
husband was a necessary party to any suit against his wife at common law.”73  
At the time of the British tax’s enactment, coverture denied British wives legal 
recognition as separate individuals from their husbands for most legal 
purposes.74  From the early thirteenth century until the second half of the 
nineteenth century, English common law held that most of the property a wife 
owned as feme sole came under the control of her husband at the time of their 
 
 65. SABINE, supra note 60, at 14. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.; SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 62. 
 68. 34 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND col. 4–5 (London, T.C. Hansard 1819); 
SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 72–73. 
 69. 34 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, supra note 68, col. 1152. 
 70. Id. col. 5. 
 71. Act of 1799, 39 Geo. 3, c. 41 (repealed 1816).  The tax form specifically required 
husbands to include their wives’ separate property.  Id. c. 41.  In 1803, a provision was added 
allowing wives acting as sole traders who did not live with their husbands to file separately.  An 
Act for Granting to his Majesty, Until the Sixth Day of May Next After the Ratification of 
Definitive Treaty of Peace, a Contribution on the Profits Arising from Property, Professions, 
Trades, and Offices, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 122, § 91, sch. D. 
 72. See SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 103. 
 73. ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 36. 
 74. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 550–51 (3d ed. 1990); 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE 
FIRST EDITION OF 1765–1769  430 (University of Chicago Press, 1979); Mary Beth Combs, “A 
Measure of Legal Independence”: The 1870 Married Women’s Property Act and the Portfolio 
Allocations of British Wives, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 1028, 1032 (2005). 
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marriage.75  While this was the general law of coverture, it did not apply in 
practice to wives of the wealthiest families or, as recent studies have shown, 
necessarily to any group of wives.76  Wives along the income spectrum found 
means to preserve their separate property, owning and, more importantly, 
controlling that property.77  A wife’s separate property, for example if held in 
trust, could not be reached by her husband or by her husband’s creditors.78 
This economic reality sheds light on how coverture functioned in practice: 
It was a legal fiction regulating the relationship between society and the family 
more than an expected condition of marital relations.  In other words, 
outsiders, and particularly the government, generally dealt with one member of 
the family even if within the family there were multiple decision-makers.79  
Under coverture, this one member was the husband.  The British income tax 
continued the traditional coverture model, requiring HM Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC), at the time called Inland Revenue,80 to collect only from husbands, 
even though husbands who paid significant income tax would likely have had 
wives with separate income beyond their husbands’ reach on which they had to 
pay tax.81 
Thus, husband taxation required that husbands pay tax on income that they 
neither owned nor controlled.  Moreover, while husbands were legally 
responsible for reporting all of the couple’s income, there was no means for 
legally compelling a wife to inform her husband of her sources or amount of 
income.82  It is surprising that wealthy men, likely some in Parliament, did not 
 
 75. 1 LAWS RESPECTING WOMEN 151 (Oceana Publ’ns, Inc. 1974) (1777); see also BAKER, 
supra note 74, at 552. 
 76. Margot Finn, Women, Consumption and Coverture in England, c.1760–1860, 39 HIST. J. 
703, 705–06 (1996). 
 77. BAKER, supra note 74, at 552–53; AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN 
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 150–51 (1993); R.J. MORRIS, MEN, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN 
ENGLAND, 1780–1870: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF FAMILY STRATEGIES AMONGST 
THE LEEDS MIDDLE CLASSES  233–38 (2005); TIM STRETTON, WOMEN WAGING LAW IN 
ELIZABETHAN ENGLAND 26–27, 119–23 (1998); Finn, supra note 76, at 705–06; Joanne Bailey, 
Comment, Favoured or Oppressed? Married Women, Property and ‘Coverture’ in England, 
1660–1800, 17 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 351, 363–66 (2002). 
 78. Combs, supra note 74, at 1032–33 n.20. 
 79. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, INCOME TAX & SEX DISCRIMINATION 7 (1978). 
 80. I have used HMRC throughout this article for consistency. 
 81. See ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 36 
(explaining how a husband would still be liable for a wife’s earned income and investment 
income).  It is beyond the scope of this article to examine early income tax records and trust and 
probate records to see how many husbands, in fact, paid tax on their wives’ income.  Although 
much of wives’ property likely did not produce income, that was by no means always the case.  
MORRIS, supra note 77, at 254–63 (detailing the flow of income from womens’ trusts). 
 82. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, supra note 79, at 22.  For at least one case in which a 
husband was jailed because he could not obtain information of his wife’s income, see 64 PARL. 
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1914) 2017. 
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draft the statute so that it taxed each spouse as an individual.  This would have 
decreased their tax burdens and eliminated the situation of husbands being 
taxed on someone else’s property.  That they did not draft the law this way 
likely meant either: 1) Wives’ trusts and other separate property meant little in 
practice, and husbands still felt they owned their wives’ separate property; or 
2) It seemed equitable to tax the couple on its combined income, as if their 
shared interests as a couple overrode the spouses’ separate economic interests 
for purposes of taxation.83  Regardless of which view prevailed, the first 
modern income tax taxed couples as a unit. 
At the same time that the British income tax was proving that it could raise 
revenue, the women’s movement began to win statutory advances in the law.84  
The Married Woman’s Property Acts of 1870 and 1882 gave wives the right to 
own and control most forms of personal property as well as rights to their 
earnings.85  One scholar has seen these acts as the “greatest transfer of 
resources from married men to married women which has ever taken place.”86  
As these legal changes were altering the ownership of property within families, 
husbands continued to be responsible for the tax due on their wives’ income, 
and husbands did not lobby to change this system.87  Indeed, in the nineteenth 
century, “the principle of aggregation raised no issue of major importance.”88  
Then, in the late nineteenth century, women, not their husbands, made 
individual filing, if not individual taxation, an important and recurrent issue as 
part of the women’s rights movement.89 
In time, Parliament began to recognize wives in the tax system, first by 
granting them their own exemption, or “allowance” as they are called in the 
U.K.90  Previously, Parliament had given some married couples an additional 
exemption, the married man’s allowance (MMA), only if the wife engaged in 
paid employment.91  Although this meant that husbands already had larger 
 
 83. The latter position might also reflect the fact that tax rates were low. 
 84. For a discussion of the movement, see JAN PAHL, MONEY AND MARRIAGE 19–22 
(1989). 
 85. Married Women’s Property Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.); Married Women’s 
Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75 (Eng.); see also PAHL, supra note 84, at 21–22. 
 86. PAHL, supra note 84, at 22. 
 87. Id. at 19–20. 
 88. ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 36. 
 89. G.P. Marshall & A.J. Walsh, Marital Status and Variations in Income Tax Burdens, 4 
BRIT. TAX REV. 236, 237 (1970). 
 90. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N ON THE INCOME TAX, 1920, [Cmd.] 615, at 56–57 
(U.K.) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N].  An exemption is an amount of income not 
subject to tax.  See I.R.C. § 151(a) (2006).  I will call British allowances “exemptions” for the 
convenience of my audience. 
 91. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 56–57 (describing the married man’s 
allowance).  After World War I, the husband received the MMA whether or not his wife engaged 
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exemptions than single taxpayers who received a single person’s allowance 
(SPA), Parliament enacted an additional wife’s earned income allowance 
(WEIA) that offset wives’ wage income, income still reported by their 
husbands.92  As the following chart shows, while a wife lost the SPA she had 
as an unmarried woman when she married, if she had earned income it was 
offset by the WEIA.93  Because the SPA offset both unearned and earned 
income and the WEIA offset only earned income, the WEIA effectively 
reallocated the tax burden from earned to unearned income.94 
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In 1914, Parliament further extended recognition to wives by giving them 
the option of separate filing.95  Thereafter, wives could file individual returns.  
While this gave wives some independence from their husbands, the tax due 
was still calculated on the basis of the couple’s total income.96  The liability 
was then divided in proportion to each spouse’s respective income.97  
Husbands could also make this election and might do so “to prevent a husband 
with a small income being liable for the tax on his wife’s substantial 
 
in paid employment.  Id.  See also Roger Kerridge, Taxation and Marriage, 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
77, 79 (1988). 
 92. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 56–57; EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 
COMM’N, supra note 79, at 7–8.  The value of the WEIA was raised to that of the SPA in order to 
induce women to enter the job market.  Id. at 7. 
 93. EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES COMM’N, supra note 79, at 7.  If a husband did not use all of the 
MMA, the remainder could be transferred and used to offset his wife’s income; any of the WEIA 
not used against the wife’s earned income was forfeited.  See id. at 8. 
 94. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 56–57. 
 95. Finance Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 10, § 9 (U.K.); REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, 
supra note 90, at 56–57. 
 96. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 56–57.  While spouses could elect 
individual filing, the system still imposed joint taxation, so the calculation of taxes due was based 
on spouses’ combined returns.  Id. 
 97. Id. 
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investment income.”98  This option thus allowed spouses the independence of 
individual filing, but it did not allow them independence in their dealings with 
the government or reduce their marriage penalties.  This option was not widely 
known and was rarely used.99 
British women, unsatisfied with these modest gains, pressured the 
government to have the Royal Commissions convened in 1920 and 1954 
consider individual taxation.100  Recognizing that individual taxation would 
decrease the effective tax rates of wealthy couples because couples would shift 
income between spouses to maximize use of lower rate brackets, the 
Commissions did not find the urgings for individual taxation persuasive.101  
For example, the 1920 Commission wrote: 
  We feel that the demand of those who favour this change is in effect not so 
much a demand for separate assessment or separate recovery of tax—this they 
can have under the existing law—as for a diminution in Income Tax liability 
on the ground that part of the joint income happens to belong to the wife.102 
The government estimated that the loss in revenue would be substantial: £20 
million in 1920 and £143 million in 1954.103  Moreover, according to both 
Commissions, families functioned as units and should be taxed as such.104  
Professor Lillian Knowles, the first female Professor of Economic History and 
the only woman on the 1920 Commission, issued a powerful dissent.105 
While the U.K. was resisting change, many other countries were re-
evaluating their tax units.  The German Constitutional Court, in 1957, held that 
joint taxation of married couples imposed a higher tax on some married 
couples than if the spouses had not married, which violated constitutional 
 
 98. Mavis Moulin, Taxmen Are Male and Chauvinists All, GUARDIAN (Manchester), Mar. 2, 
1974, at 19. 
 99. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 57. 
 100. See id. at 57–58 (noting that there had been a “great deal of public attention” to the 
matter and that the committee interviewed numerous witnesses from women’s societies); ROYAL 
COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at iii. 
 101. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 57–58. 
 102. Id. at 58.  See also ROYAL COMM’N ON THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra 
note 90, at 36–37. 
 103. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 58; ROYAL COMM’N ON THE 
TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 37. 
 104. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 57–58.  See also ROYAL COMM’N ON 
THE TAXATION OF PROFITS & INCOME, supra note 62, at 36, 40–41.  There was a sense in 1954 
that any potential harm caused by aggregation was offset by the husband and wife’s exemptions.  
Id. at 36.  If a husband who had income taxable at the basic tax rate was married to a woman with 
investment income and their joint income was below the surtax rate level, their tax bill would 
only be higher if the wife’s separate income was more than £90, a not insignificant amount in 
1954.  Id.  If a wife’s income was earned, their combined tax bill would only be higher if their 
joint income exceeded the princely sum of £2,100.  Oldman & Temple, supra note 3, at 589. 
 105. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM’N, supra note 90, at 151. 
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protections of marriage and the family.106  This led the German government to 
adopt income-splitting joint filing which gave most married couples favorable 
treatment compared to their single counterparts.107  On the other hand, while 
Canada had a system of individual taxation since its income tax was first 
introduced in 1917, both the Royal Commission on Taxation and the Royal 
Commission on the Status of Women unsuccessfully recommended the family 
as the tax unit.108  The Royal Commission on Taxation, in particular, was 
troubled by the amount of tax avoidance perpetrated under Canada’s individual 
system, even though the law purportedly denied recognition of transfers 
between spouses for tax avoidance purposes.109 
The U.S. also engaged in these debates.  When the modern American tax 
was first enacted in 1913, Congressman Cordell Hull of Tennessee 
contemplated requiring spouses to file jointly to prevent wealthy couples from 
using the family as a means of tax avoidance as they had during the Civil War, 
but Hull ultimately concluded that married women’s property acts would make 
such a law unconstitutional.110  As a result, Congress enacted a system that 
 
 106. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 17, 1957, 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 56, 1957 (Ger.); see also 
THURONYI, supra note 21, at 93.  Courts in Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Korea, and Spain have also 
held joint taxation unconstitutional.  Id. 
 107. AULT ET AL., supra note 21, at 67. 
 108. See 3 ROYAL COMM’N ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
TAXATION: TAXATION OF INCOME 12–15 (1966) (Can.); ROYAL COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF 
WOMEN, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 303–04 (1970) 
(Can.).  Half of the federal Interdepartmental Committee on the Taxation of Women in 1975–
1976 also wanted joint taxation.  Dulude, supra note 20, at 84–85. 
 109. See Dulude, supra note 20, at 83–84.  For a recent discussion of individual filing in 
Canada, with a sense of concern, see David G. Duff, Neuman and Beyond: Income Splitting, Tax 
Avoidance, and Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada, 32 CAN. BUS. L.J. 345 
(1999) (examining a relevant case); Herbert J. Schuertze, Income Splitting Among the Self-
Employed, 39 CAN. J. ECON. 1195 (2006) (estimating the amount of illegal income splitting in 
Canada); Frances Woolley, Policy Forum: Liability Without Control—The Curious Case of 
Pension Income Splitting, 55 CAN. TAX J. 603 (2007) (arguing for alternate measures to achieve 
the effect of income splitting); Lisa Philipps, Income Splitting and Gender Equality: The Case for 
Incentivizing Intra-Household Wealth Transfers (Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ. 
Law, Research Paper Ser. No. 04/2010, 2010) (examining how income splitting has expanded tax 
planning opportunities for spouses).  There is a movement, at least among social conservatives, to 
allow more income splitting between Canadian spouses to aid one-earner families.  See 
Kesselman, supra note 10, at 35; Jack Mintz, Taxing Families: Does the System Need an 
Overhaul?, INST. OF MARRIAGE & FAM. REV., Spring/Summer 2008, at 15. 
 110. ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK SUPPLEMENT: 1941–42 § 1016 
(1941).  See also CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2515–16 (1863) (stating that under the 
existing system wealthy individuals abused the tax system by dividing their income among their 
family members).  Congress devoted little time to the specifics of the tax in 1913.  See Stephanie 
Hunter McMahon, A Law with a Life of Its Own: The Development of Federal Income Tax 
Statutes Through World War I, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2009). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
180 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:159 
treated the individual as the basic unit for measuring the amount of federal 
income taxes owed.111 
Many American groups looked to the U.K. in search of guidance on 
whether to change this tax unit, although Americans did not seem to be aware 
that British women had the option of individual filing and their own exemption 
for earned income.112  In response to wealthy couples’ tax avoidance, the 
Treasury Department often lobbied, unsuccessfully, for a mandatory joint 
system.113  Women’s groups, in particular the National Woman’s Party (NWP), 
noted that British women protested mandatory joint taxation as discriminatory, 
and NWP voiced similar opinions when the Treasury Department made its 
proposals.114  Dismissing claims that joint taxation discriminated against 
wives, Representative John Boehne of Indiana argued that the U.K. illustrated 
that it “does not invade the rights of a married woman.  It treats her exactly in 
the same manner as her husband.”115  Representative Edith Rogers of 
Massachusetts and Representative Frances Bolton of Ohio responded that 
British law “ha[d] always been unfair to women.”116  As the U.K. noted in its 
1954 Commission report, the U.S. responded to these debates by adopting the 
income-splitting joint return in 1948.117 
Thus, countries including the U.K. and the U.S. debated the appropriate tax 
unit, but these debates often did not result in immediate legislative change.  
They also did not result in all countries agreeing on the same answer to the 
question of what constitutes the best tax unit.  Instead, the adoption of 
individual taxation, in the U.K. at least, would require progress within the 
European women’s movement and changing domestic economic circumstances 
to provide an environment in which individual taxation could be won.  Until 
those changes came, many felt the original system, one that saw the family as a 
unit, was most fair. 
 
 111. Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 116 (1913). 
 112. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1040, at 64–68 (1941). 
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 114. E. Mary Goodman, British Women Urging Reform on Parliament, ATLANTA CONST., 
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Income Taxation Unequal, EQUAL RTS., June 4, 1926, at 130; British Women Phrase Demands, 
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B. The 1970s: The Beginning of the End 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.K. joined in a feminist revival that 
swept across Europe at the same time that the nation enjoyed a period of 
relatively rapid economic growth.118  As a result, British feminists added 
demands for financial and legal independence to their earlier critiques of the 
nation’s policies.119  There was a sense among these activists that the U.K.’s 
prosperity would allow the nation to provide this to its wives.  British demands 
were reinforced by the European Community (EC) as it issued directives for 
economic equality.120  By the 1970s, the EC included with this the adoption of 
individual taxation.  “[E]qual treatment shall mean that there shall be no 
discrimination whatso[e]ver on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by 
reference in particular to marital or family status.”121 
Many countries heeded the EC’s call; however, some countries had goals 
other than gender equality.  For example, individual taxation was introduced in 
Sweden in 1971 and was coupled with the rapid expansion of subsidized 
childcare because Sweden wanted to incentivize wives to work in order to 
reduce immigration during a national labor shortage.122  As a result of these 
changes, Sweden witnessed rising labor force participation by wives 
throughout the 1970s, but it was largely in part-time jobs.123  Indeed, Sweden 
even experienced a flow of women from full-time to part-time work.124 
Similar forces were at play in the U.K., where advances in women’s rights 
were made but a reluctance to push the advances too far remained.  A 
significant number of British women entered the paid labor market for the first 
time, but much of that increased presence was in part-time, insecure, and 
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intermittent jobs.125  While there was a seemingly dramatic growth in public 
approval for women in the workforce, this approval extended only, and extends 
today only, to women who did not have pre-school and school age children in 
the home.126  Thus, by the 1970s, the public and most government policies 
were sensitive to gender issues, but this sensitivity was tempered by a 
reluctance to grant economic independence to the country’s wives.127 
Nevertheless, in 1971, British couples with two earners won the right for 
married women to be taxed as single individuals on their earned income.128  
Thus, two years before the U.K. entered the EC (but after the Conservative 
Party had regained control of the government), Parliament responded to 
domestic and European pressure and legislated that, if both spouses elected, a 
wife could be taxed separately on her wages; her unearned income still had to 
be reported by, and taxed to, her husband.  There was a cost imposed on 
individual taxation that might have outweighed the economic and 
psychological benefits of separate status: the inability to claim the marital 
exemption, the MMA.129  At the time, the MMA, at £600, was larger than the 
SPA, at £420.130  For couples with two earners, the wife’s exemption, the 
WEIA, of £420 was added on top of this larger MMA.131  If a couple opted to 
be taxed separately as two single persons, for example if the wife earned 
enough income to benefit from double-dipping into lower tax brackets, the 
couple would lose the benefit of the difference between the MMA plus the 
WEIA (£1,020) and two SPAs (£840), or £180, of exempted income.  In 1975, 
in couples where wives did work for wages, wives’ income on average made 
up only 20.4% of the family’s total income.132  If couples filed separately, only 
 
 125. Jonathan Gershuny, Sexual Divisions and the Distribution of Work in the Household, in 
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this portion of a couple’s income would enjoy double-dipping in the wife’s low 
tax brackets, often not enough to warrant the loss of the MMA.133 
Shortly after this change in law, the U.K. entered the EC and, within the 
decade, the British economy plummeted.134  After several major strikes, the 
government declared a state of emergency, and most of British industry was 
put on a three-day week.135  Inflation ravaged the country, and unemployment 
steadily rose until 1977 and, although unemployment lessened somewhat from 
1977 to 1979, it continued to rise until 1986.136  By the late 1970s, top tax rates 
were as high as 98% in order to pay off a loan from the International Monetary 
Fund and, as an unintended, but not unexpected, consequence of the rate 
increase, tax avoidance was rampant.137 
In this economic downturn, the British Equal Opportunities Commission 
(EOC) published a booklet entitled Income Tax and Sex Discrimination.138  
This independent, non-departmental public body complained that the HMRC 
did not advertise benefits, such as individual taxation, which would benefit 
wives.139  Using excerpts from letters it had received, the EOC also illustrated 
that the system deeming a wife’s income to be her husband’s was regarded, “at 
best, as humiliating and, at worst discriminatory.”140  The anger was directed 
less at the economics of husband taxation than at its mechanics—wives would 
often receive letters from the HMRC about their jobs requesting their husbands 
send in corrected forms.141  The EOC noted that women were frustrated that 
the Inland Revenue “persists in treating them as if they do not exist.”142  One 
woman later requested not individual taxation but, instead, that both spouses be 
required to sign a joint tax return in order to “ensure not only that the wife’s 
status as an equal partner was recognised, but that she took her share in the 
joint financial chores.”143 
While the EOC promoted individual taxation, it also recognized that 
couples might use that system to reduce their taxes by shifting unearned 
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income between spouses.144  Because this would be costly to the government, 
the EOC concluded that the income tax should continue to aggregate a married 
couple’s unearned income for the determination of the applicable tax rates, but 
the amount of tax due should be apportioned and individual assessments 
issued.145  The goal was to grant wives independence while preventing tax 
avoidance, a problem everyone at the time understood well. 
In response to a deluge of more than 2,000 letters reacting to the EOC’s 
report, the British government commissioned a green paper entitled The 
Taxation of Husband and Wife, released in 1980, the beginning of a decade in 
which policymakers would focus on cutting tax rates.146  A green paper is a 
tentative, open-ended government report, and this one supported either of two 
courses of action: 1) allow spouses to choose between joint and individual 
taxation; or 2) change to a Canadian-style mandatory individual system.147  
The British government’s efforts at tax reform stalled after publishing this 
paper.148 
The U.S. did not adopt a similar method of partial individual taxation in 
the 1970s; instead, American policymakers focused on the interests of single 
taxpayers.149  The need for some limitation on the burden shouldered by single 
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taxpayers had been recognized almost from the income-splitting joint return’s 
creation in 1948.150  In response to public pressure, in 1951, certain qualified 
single persons with dependents were given one-half of the tax advantage 
enjoyed by married couples.151  As the qualifications for this benefit were 
gradually loosened, broader discussions about the equity of denying single 
individuals equality with married couples continued.152  Congress proposed 23 
bills in 1967, 13 bills in 1968, and 61 bills in 1969 addressing this concern.153  
Instead of abolishing income splitting, these legislators wanted to nullify its 
impact by extending its tax savings to more taxpayers.154  Political compromise 
produced the Tax Reform Act of 1969 that ensured all taxpayers filing as 
single individuals would not pay more than 120% of that paid by joint filers.155 
Although the U.S.’s 1969 tax revision added a new tax penalty on 
marriage, by which two single persons both with taxable income could find 
their income tax liabilities increased if they married, it was argued to be “a 
necessary result of changing the income-splitting relationship between single 
and joint returns.”156  In 1972, the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy 
acknowledged that the Treasury Department had known there would be the 
imposition of higher taxes on some married couples prior to the legislation’s 
enactment and that Congress had been warned.157  This warning does not seem 
to have stuck with politicians who claimed to be surprised when letters began 
pouring in complaining of the “marriage penalty.”158  Nevertheless, the 
 
 150. See, e.g., H.R. 1325, 81st Cong. (1949) (reducing tax obligations of widows and 
widowers).  See also George F. James, The Income of Married Couples: Is the Knutson Bill 
Justice?, 26 TAXES 311, 366 (1948) (discussing the proposed change in treatment of widows); 
Frances M. Ryan, Federal Tax Treatment of the Family, 33 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 21–24 (1949) 
(discussing changes to federal tax law implemented by the Revenue Act of 1948).  It was reported 
that Congress also began considering adjusting the rate schedule for married couples.  House 
Group Votes Down Tougher Tax Treatment for Married Couples, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1951, at 6.  
They also considered deductions for war widows’ child care expenses.  Would Aid War Widows, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1948, at 20. 
 151. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 301, 65 Stat. 452, 480–83 (1951). 
 152. Ventry, supra note 149, at 298–330. 
 153. Id. at 342. 
 154. Id. at 426. 
 155. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 678–85 (codified 
as amended at IRC §§ 1–3 (2006)). 
 156. Id. § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 678; STAFF OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 
91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 10, 222–24 (J. Comm. 
Print 1970). 
 157. Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses are 
Working: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 92d Cong. 73–75 (1972) (statement 
of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy, Dep’t of Treasury). 
 158. Ventry, supra note 149, at 419. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
186 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:159 
immediate aftermath was largely a demand for still more help for singles.159  In 
1970 and 1971, members of Congress introduced seventeen and fifty-nine 
pieces of legislation, respectively, to equalize the income tax treatment of 
married and single taxpayers.160 
Therefore, although in the late 1960s and early 1970s the U.S. and the 
U.K. both enacted legislation regarding the tax unit, the paths they chose were 
different and reflected different goals.  As the U.K. was giving wives the 
ability to reduce their taxes by separately reporting their earned income and 
being taxed as single taxpayers on that income, the U.S. was providing tax cuts 
for single taxpayers and, as a result, began imposing a tax penalty on couples 
with two earners.  While both approaches were adopted by conservative 
elements in their respective governments, their rhetoric reflected a different 
valuation of wives’ employment. 
C. The 1980s: The Time Is Now 
As the equal treatment of women gained greater popular acceptance in the 
U.K., the public bureaucracies overseeing the enforcement of the laws 
mandating that equal treatment were steadily losing popular support.  When 
Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979, she did so on a wave of 
criticism of statism.161  Thatcher, like her American counterpart President 
Ronald Reagan, prioritized the reduction of the role of the state in the economy 
and re-focused attention on individual rights.162  The new vision of the income 
tax was intentionally less redistributive and sought to stimulate the economy 
by reducing marginal tax rates and increasing exemptions.163  As in the U.S. 
under Reagan, during Thatcher’s tenure, there was a gradual economic 
recovery in the U.K. and a boom in the late 1980s.164 
 
 159. See, e.g., 118 CONG REC. S35,988 (1972) (statement of Sen. Robert William Packwood); 
118 CONG. REC. 16,117 (1972) (statement of Rep. Bella S. Abzug); 116 CONG. REC. H36,634–
H36,635 (1970) (statement of Rep. Edward Koch); 117 CONG. REC. S3037–S3038 (1971) 
(statement of Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff); 116 CONG. REC. 8442 (1970) (statement of Rep. 
William L. St. Onge). 
 160. Ventry, supra note 149, at 426. 
 161. David, supra note 118, at 21. 
 162. See id.; John Tiley, United Kingdom, in FAMILY TAXATION IN EUROPE 129, 131–32 
(Maria Teresa Soler Roch ed., 1999). 
 163. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD JOBS STUDY: TAXATION, 
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 45, 63–64 (1995).  Tax rates rose steadily between 1973 
and 1979 when rates halted.  Price, supra note 41, at 592. 
 164. Lee Bawden & Frank Levy, The Economic Well-Being of Families and Individuals, in 
THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE 
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 459, 482–83 (John L. Palmer & Isabel V. Sawhill eds., Changing 
Domestic Priorities Ser., 2d prtg. 1982); Cairncross, supra note 118, at 67. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] LONDON CALLING 187 
In the early Thatcher era, wives’ tax treatment continued to gain significant 
attention.165  Most responses to the 1980 green paper favored individual 
taxation; they demonstrated widespread dissatisfaction with husband taxation 
largely because it was thought to deny women independence and privacy in tax 
matters and to impose a tax penalty on marriage.166  On the heels of the green 
paper’s publication, a widely-read survey circulated decrying the extent of 
sharing (or, more accurately, the lack of sharing) within marriage.167  Professor 
Jan Pahl concluded that “there is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest 
that such sharing of income cannot be taken for granted.”168  Pahl found in the 
standard patterns of money management within marriage, wives came out the 
loser in control, discretion, and freedom.169 
Nonetheless, British proponents of individual taxation could not win 
sufficient parliamentary support, in part because they could not agree how an 
individual-based system should operate.170  In particular, they fought over how 
to reconcile the old exemption system with individual taxation.  While many 
advocated transferable exemptions, so that if a wife had no income of her own 
her exemption could be used to offset her husband’s income, others worried 
that this would dampen wives’ incentive to work.171  Critics argued that if a 
wife returned to work after a period of working at home, she would have to 
choose between leaving her exemption with her husband and paying more tax 
herself or taking back her exemption and increasing the tax imposed on her 
husband.172  As many as 3.5% of wives engaged in paid employment at the 
time, totaling 200,000 women, would leave the labor force if given an 
exemption that they could transfer to their husband.173  It was on that basis the 
House of Lords argued against transferrable exemptions.174 
While mired in internal debates over the operation of individual taxation, 
the U.K. continued to face pressure from the EC to change its tax unit.  The 
EC’s push for greater equality between the sexes and favorable taxation for 
 
 165. Lorraine Fox Harding, “Family Values” and Conservative Government Policy: 1979–
1997, in CHANGING FAMILY VALUES 119, 124 (Gill Jagger & Caroline Wright eds., 1999). 
 166. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 146, at forward. 
 167. Jan Pahl, Patterns of Money Management within Marriage, 9 J. SOC. POL’Y. 313, 316 
(1980). 
 168. Id. at 314.  Pahl published a book on the topic in 1989.  PAHL, supra note 84.  Pahl has 
updated her studies in Jan Pahl, His Money, Her Money: Recent Research on Financial 
Organisation in Marriage, 16 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 361 (1995). 
 169. See Pahl, supra note 167, at 320, 330, 333. 
 170. Dulude, supra note 20, at 78–79. 
 171. Id. at 78. 
 172. PAHL, supra note 84, at 164. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 165.  The issue of transferrable exemptions was revived in the Conservative 
Party’s 1997 Election Manifesto.  Ruth Lister, Promoting Women’s Economic Independence, in 
REWRITING THE SEXUAL CONTRACT, supra note 118, at 180, 267 n.11. 
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women focused on women’s right to engage in paid labor.175  Although British 
wives had the ability to be taxed separately on earned income, in a survey 
undertaken by the EC, 21% of those polled thought that income taxes might be 
discouraging wives from working.176  This should have raised questions about 
how salient the issue of the tax unit was with taxpayers, but the survey neither 
distinguished between the incentive effects of tax rates and tax units nor 
discussed these different potential causes of wives’ dissatisfaction with the tax 
system.177 
This renewed European concern might have focused more attention on 
helping wives had many in the U.K. not experienced a deterioration in their 
economic circumstances and a backlash of social conservatism.  While the 
1980s were a period of economic growth, they were also a period of 
tremendous wealth polarization in both the U.K. and the U.S.178  The gender 
pattern of employment also changed as businesses sought a more flexible labor 
market.179  This benefited women and disadvantaged men, destabilizing 
traditional labor arrangements.180  Because of changed labor patterns and 
significant, static levels of unemployment, the period was marred by poverty 
and social discontent.181  As in the U.S., which faced similar pressures from 
 
 175. Commission Proposal to Council for a New Community Action Programme on the 
Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Women, at 18–19, COM (1981) 758 final (Dec. 9, 1981).  
See also Commission Memorandum to Council on Income Taxation and Equal Treatment for Men 
and Women, at 3, 12, COM (1984) 695 final (Dec. 14, 1984); Council Resolution on the 
Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Women, 1982 O.J. (C 186) 3; Resolution on the Position of 
Women in the European Community, 1981 O.J. (C 50) 35–36.  The OECD was likewise active 
with respect to this issue.  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE INTEGRATION OF 
WOMEN INTO THE ECONOMY 137–41, 153–59 (1985) (noting that traditional tax structures 
disadvantage women in the labor market).  Other groups concentrated on this issue as well: The 
International Labour Organization, Council of Europe, European Trade Union Confederation, 
European Youth Forum, Confederation of Family Organizations in the European Community, et 
cetera.  Commission Memorandum to Council on Equal Opportunities for Women, at 6, (COM 
1985) 801 final (Dec. 19, 1985) [hereinafter Memorandum on Equal Opportunities for Women]. 
 176. HÉLÈNE RIFFAULT & JEAN-FRANÇOIS TCHERNIA, COMM’N OF THE EUR. CMTY, 
EUROPEAN WOMEN IN PAID EMPLOYMENT: 1984 19 (1984). 
 177. See id. 
 178. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 163, at 46. 
 179. Ros Coward, Was Feminism Wrong about the Family?, in REWRITING THE SEXUAL 
CONTRACT, supra note 118, at 64, 65–66. 
 180. Id. at 65–67. 
 181. See Peter Ingram et al., Strike Incidence in British Manufacturing in the 1980s, 46 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 704, 704 (1993) (noting that one in forty bargaining groups went on 
strike in the 1980s); Interview by Sheila Rowbotham with Jean McCrindle, More Than Just a 
Memory: Some Political Implications of Women’s Involvement in the Miners’ Strike, 1984–85, 
FEMINIST REV., Summer 1986, at 109, 117 (discussing how wives in mining villages who were 
unhappy with community conditions and poverty became involved in the strike efforts in order to 
improve conditions for their husbands and themselves); Clive Unsworth, The Riots of 1981: 
Popular Violence and the Politics of Law and Order, 9 J.L. & SOC’Y 63, 81 (1982) (noting that 
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de-industrialization, the troubled working class in the U.K. embraced family 
values as a source of security in an uncertain time.182  This conservatism 
extended beyond the working class, and many of society’s main concerns at 
the time were stable, heterosexual marriages with a gender division of roles 
and the support of these relationships by the government.183  This reversed 
Britain’s earlier ideological push to increase working wives’ rights.184 
In 1985, in the midst of this instability, the government commissioned a 
second green paper on the topic of individual taxation.185  Unlike modern 
American advocates of individual taxation, the British government’s focus was 
not on easing the tax burdens of two-earner couples.186  Although the 
government also claimed to want to give wives privacy and independence in 
their tax matters, it primarily sought tax reduction for one-earner couples.187  
The Commission focused on families’ life cycles and concluded that it was 
natural for a family to sometimes have one earner and, at other times, two.188  
The Commission thought husband taxation needed to be changed because it 
disadvantaged couples when they were likely to have only one earner, such as 
when they had young children.189  The one-earner couples to benefit from this 
Commission’s proposals were wealthy ones.190  This formula for tax reduction 
would not reduce the tax burden of low-income couples who had no income to 
shift between spouses or of most two-earner couples because wives already 
had a WEIA equal to the SPA to exempt most, if not all, their wages.191  
Individual taxation, therefore, allowed the Conservative government to 
reinforce the traditional, primary-earner family for wealthy couples by cutting 
 
changing technology in the workplace will keep unemployment, and resulting discontent, high); 
Victims of Thatcherism, 20 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1717, 1717 (1985) (noting high unemployment 
and resulting violence and unrest). 
 182. ALVIN Y. SO, SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, 
AND WORLD-SYSTEM THEORIES 238 (1990); Anne Barlow, Regulation of Cohabitation, 
Changing Family Policies and Social Attitudes: A Discussion of Britain Within Europe, 26 LAW 
& POL’Y 57, 60 (2004); Harding, supra note 165, at 119–20. 
 183. Harding, supra note 165, at 119. 
 184. Id. 
 185. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, THE REFORM OF PERSONAL TAXATION, 1986, 
Cmnd. 9756 (U.K.).  The government also sought to allow all exemptions be transferred between 
spouses in order “[t]o recognise the shared responsibilities of a married couple.”  Id. at 12. 
 186. Id. at 4–5. 
 187. Id. at 3, 5. 
 188. Id. at 5. 
 189. Id. at 5.  There were no limitations proposed to ensure that favorable treatment would 
only help couples when they had young children or other care-giving responsibilities. 
 190. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 3. 
 191. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.  Transferable exemptions might have 
reduced lower-income one-earner couples’ tax burdens, but it failed to win parliamentary support.  
See supra text accompanying notes 170–71. 
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taxes and did so without increasing the size of the government, pleasing both 
the fiscally and socially conservative sides of the party. 
While the 1986 green paper strongly supported individual taxation, as had 
prior government reports, it recognized that under such a system, many couples 
would have an incentive to rearrange their affairs to reduce their collective 
income taxes.192  It concluded, however, that “[i]t is very unlikely that all 
couples would seek to rearrange the ownership of their income-bearing assets 
in order to take maximum advantage of separate tax rate bands.  Many would 
not be able, or would not want, to make the necessary transfer of assets.”193  It 
was estimated that if every couple able to take advantage of income shifting 
did so to the maximum extent, it would cost the government £100 million.194  
Consideration of whether Parliament would need to take steps to prevent this 
tax avoidance was deferred.195 
The timing of the proposed change was crucial.  The Commission knew it 
had to wait until the computerization of the PAYE system in 1988 before it 
could make such an extensive change.196  Individual taxation would increase 
the number of taxpayers and require the coordination of family deductions.197  
Waiting, however, threatened the proposal.  There was no assurance that the 
economic boom would continue or that there would not be a change in tax 
philosophy.  Luckily for advocates of individual taxation, 1988 was a peak 
economic year.198  Although 1988 was the end of post-war economic growth, 
the government retained the political capacity to change the tax unit and 
thereby meet its goal of helping one-earner couples while complying with 
European directives.199 
The EC had once again demanded that “[t]ax discrimination should be 
examined with a view to arriving at a neutral system which does not act as a 
disincentive, particularly with regard to the taxation of the earnings of married 
women.”200  The House of Lords understood that the EC also recommended a 
tax system that was neutral as between married couples where one spouse or 
both spouses were in paid employment.201  The commentary provided by the 
House of Lords noted the seeming inconsistency in the EC’s objectives: 
 
 192. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 26. 
 193. Id. (emphasis added).  The government was also concerned that there would be “great 
practical difficulties in enforcing such special provisions.”  Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1. 
 197. See CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 12. 
 198. Charles Feinstein, Success and Failure: British Economic Growth Since 1948, in 3 THE 
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN SINCE 1700: 1939–1992, supra note 118, at 95, 95. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Memorandum on Equal Opportunities for Women, supra note 175, at 12. 
 201. O’Donoghue & Sutherland, supra note 2, at 568. 
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  “Neutral” is here presumably intended to mean that one-earner and two-
earner couples with the same total income should in principle pay the same tax.  
However, such neutrality can be guaranteed only under an aggregate taxation 
system.  With independent taxation, the total tax depends on how the earnings 
are split.  There thus appears to be a contradiction between the first part of the 
recommendation and the second.202 
Without reconciling those two objectives, Parliament adopted mandatory 
individual taxation in 1988 to go into effect in 1990, so that all spouses were 
taxed separately on earned and unearned income.203  Conservative Chancellor 
Nigel Lawson pushed hard for this change to the tax unit.204  Perhaps counter-
intuitively to American scholars, Margaret Thatcher herself did not support 
individual taxation, believing it would alienate working wives.205  Because of 
the British system of exemptions, individual taxation would do little for most 
two-earner couples and provide a lot of tax-planning opportunities for one-
earner couples.206  Lawson was able to win this debate, over Thatcher’s 
objections, by demonstrating that individual taxation would ease 
unemployment by keeping wives out of the labor market.207  This motive flew 
in the face of European directives even as it appeared to implement European 
policy. 
The U.K.’s Parliament also recognized that individual taxation would 
cause some married couples to shift income between spouses to reduce their 
 
 202. Id. (quoting SELECT COMM. ON THE EUROPEAN COMTYS, COMMENTARY, 1985-6, H.L. 
15I, ¶ 31 (U.K.)). 
 203. Finance Act 1988, c. 39, § 32 (Eng.).  This change allowed for confidentiality between 
spouses.  Before the 1988 Act, a wife had to disclose to her husband her income in order for him 
to accurately complete the couple’s return, but a husband did not have to disclose his information 
to his wife.  Susan Himmelweit, Making Visible the Hidden Economy: The Case for Gender-
Impact Analysis of Economic Policy, 8 FEMINIST ECON. 49, 61 (2002).  Many lamented what this 
did for women’s bargaining position within marriage.  See id.  Since 1990, husbands are only able 
to find out about their wives’ tax affairs, and vice versa, if they are given written authority.  
Independent Taxation Manual—IN3: Confidentiality, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hm 
rc.gov.uk/manuals/inmanual/IN3.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 204. NIGEL LAWSON, THE VIEW FROM NO. 11 814, 881 (2003).  Lawson’s predecessor, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, also wanted individual taxation.  Id. at 882.  When Lawson pushed for larger 
personal exemptions, he was troubled that couples with two earners would receive a higher 
exemption than those with only one earner.  Id. at 881.  Lawson wanted transferable exemptions 
to help one-earner couples, but he had to abandon transferrable exemptions because the HMRC 
did not have the capacity to handle them until 1993, which would have been after another general 
election.  Id. at 883, 885.  Some women thought the transferrable exemption would require 
couples to share financial information, but Lawson thought “the wife for whom privacy was 
important could always purchase it cheaply enough by letting her husband keep the transferable 
allowance.”  Id. at 884–85. 
 205. Id. at 882. 
 206. See id. 
 207. Id. at 884. 
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collective tax obligations.208  There was debate on an amendment proposed by 
the Labour Party that would deny this tax result for gifts between spouses that 
were “undertaken with the sole or main objective of achieving a tax 
advantage.”209  Norman Lamont, a Conservative member of Parliament, 
complained that this prohibition: 
would undermine the very basis of independent taxation.  If the amendment 
were carried, there would be no independence for married couples, nor would 
people be free to arrange their affairs as they wished . . . Independent taxation 
is bound to mean that some couples will transfer assets between them with the 
result that their total tax bill will be reduced.  This is an inevitable and 
acceptable consequence of taxing husbands and wives separately.210 
Thus, there was recognition in 1988 that some couples would use individual 
taxation for their own economic advancement, and that result was accepted by 
the Conservative government. 
While individual taxation proved relatively easy to adopt in 1988, it 
remained difficult to adjust exemption levels.  Exemptions are particularly 
important in the U.K. because the British government exempts significant 
amounts of income from tax.211  In 1990, almost 25% of the gross earnings of 
the average single worker and 65% of those of the average married couple was 
exempted from tax, which amounted to 2.9, 3.7, and 4.5 times the relief given 
to single persons, married couples, and heads of households, respectively, in 
the U.S.212  Due to the existing state of exemptions at the time Parliament was 
contemplating reform in the 1980s (and the fact Parliament was considering 
increasing exemptions), because two-earner families already enjoyed higher 
exemptions (the MMA plus the WEIA), a simple across-the-board increase in 
exemptions would have given two-earner couples 45% of the tax relief created 
by the measure.213  This group constituted only 30% of taxpaying families.214  
As a result, Parliament adjusted exemptions to produce a more proportionate 
result.  Specifically, it awarded each spouse a personal allowance (PA), equal 
to the former SPA, and the couple received a married couple’s allowance 
(MCA) equal to the additional amount previously received under the MMA.215  
Couples were therefore no worse off after 1990 than they had been before.  
 
 208. Anne Redston, Income Sharing: The Nelsonian Option, 2007 BRIT. TAX REV. 680, 682 
(2007). 
 209. Id. (quoting Chris Smith’s proposed amendment to the Finance Act 1989, Section 109 
relating to gifts between spouses). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Pechman & Engelhardt, supra note 3, at 3. 
 212. Id. at 3–4. 
 213. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, supra note 185, at 10. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Finance Act 1988, c. 39, §§ 257, 257A (Eng.).  Initially, the MCA was set against a 
husband’s income, but any unused portion could be transferred to the wife.  Id. § 257D. 
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The MCA was not indexed to inflation, however, so it gradually decreased in 
real value over the 1990s.216  In response to continued complaints that married 
couples were given favorable tax treatment compared to single taxpayers, the 
MCA was greatly reduced in scope such that only couples where one person 
had reached the age of sixty-five by April 2000 could take the allowance.217 
As an aside, somewhat surprising given the current state of American 
politics, consideration of same-sex couples does not appear to have played 
much role in the British adoption of individual taxation.  Individual taxation 
could have been used to make an intermediate concession to same-sex couples, 
putting them on the same footing as different-sex couples for tax purposes 
without legally recognizing their unions.  However, in the late 1980s, the 
Conservative government could successfully ignore same-sex couples without 
making any such concession.218  In fact, in 1988, Parliament referred to same-
sex relationships as “pretended family relationships.”219 
As in the U.K., the 1980s was a conservative period in the U.S.  Like 
Thatcher, Reagan campaigned on a platform of tax reduction to stimulate 
economic growth.220  One of Reagan’s first actions after taking office in 1981 
was to slash tax rates.221  Unlike the British, however, Reagan took specific 
steps to help two-earner couples, increasing the child and dependent care 
credit.  This credit originated in 1954 as a deduction, was converted to a non-
refundable credit in 1976, and increased in 1981 to be based on up to $2,000 of 
the childcare expenses for one child and $4,000 of those for two or more 
 
 216. Id. § 257A.  See also Antony Seely, Married Couple’s Allowance, H.C. Library Standard 
Note SN/BT/870 3 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/ 
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 217. Finance Act 1999, c. 16, § 31 (U.K.); see also Seely, supra note 216, at 3. 
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PARTNERSHIP: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES 30 
(2003), available at http://www.equalities.gov.uk/pdf/Civil%20Partnership%20-%20a%20frame 
work%20for%20the%20legal%20recognition%20of%20same-sex%20couples.pdf. 
 220. Charles R. Hulton & June A. O’Neill, Tax Policy, in THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT: AN 
EXAMINATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, 
supra note 164, at 97, 98. 
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children.222  Reagan’s administration also added a dual earner deduction that 
was intended to, and did, increase the number of wives in the workforce.223  
Enacted in 1981, but repealed as part of the tax rate cuts enacted in 1986, the 
dual-earner deduction saved two-earner couples up to $3,000 in taxes on the 
income of the lower-paid spouse.224  While the U.S. took these small steps to 
help two-earner families in the early 1980s, it partially pulled back from these 
steps as its conservative economics became increasingly intertwined with 
socially conservative attitudes similar to those developing in the U.K.225 
Therefore, although both countries experienced a decade of tax cuts and 
were generally conservative, only Parliament had enacted individual taxation 
by the end of the 1980s.  As the U.S. began to help two-earner couples, as the 
British had in the 1970s, the British government adopted a policy that was 
intended to benefit one-earner families.  Indeed, despite the fact that individual 
taxation had been a British feminist objective for more than a century, 
Parliament enacted individual taxation for reasons that were anything but 
feminist, seeking to help families economically while keeping women in the 
home.  Highlighting this objective, the U.K. continued to aggregate couples’ 
incomes to assess their eligibility for means-tested benefits and tax credits.226  
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British women, nonetheless, welcomed individual taxation as a victory.  
Individual taxation was deemed to end an offensive “explicit sex 
discrimination.”227 
III.  DAYS OF RECKONING 
The years following the enactment of individual taxation were not kind to 
the British economy.  The British pound was bound up in the EC’s European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism until its restrictions led to a run on the pound.228  
On Black Wednesday, 1992, Britain liberated its currency, but by then the 
Conservative Party’s credibility for managing the economy was destroyed.229  
Much as the nation had second thoughts about European exchange rates, it also 
reassessed the value of individual taxation, in part because “virtually all the 
financial benefit went to the relatively wealthy.”230  Nonetheless, the repeal of 
individual taxation has not been seriously entertained.231  The new tax unit 
appears to be here to stay. 
This Part focuses on two ways people in the U.K. have altered their 
behavior in response to the adoption of individual taxation.  First, it looks at 
the incentive effects individual taxation has had on British wives.  In theory, it 
should have induced more wives to enter the paid labor market or, 
alternatively, encouraged husbands to shift the ownership of income-producing 
property to their wives.  Both would result in more of couples’ income being 
taxed in the lower tax brackets of the country’s wives and would improve the 
relative economic power of wives.  Second, this Part looks at how individual 
taxation encourages tax avoidance by higher-income spouses who do not want 
to reduce their control over the income they shift for tax purposes.  Some 
higher-income spouses have sought to create new means of transferring tax 
ownership, but little else, to their lower-income spouses.  In turn, this tax 
avoidance generates new pressures within the British tax system. 
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A. Power to the Women 
Individual taxation recognizes wives as autonomous individuals and 
provides means for reducing couples’ collective taxes.  As a result of the 
interaction of these two effects, many scholars expect individual taxation to 
produce significant changes in married couples’ behavior.232  Proponents of 
individual taxation argue that these changes will be socially desirable.233  This 
section focuses on two of these changes: the increased paid employment of 
wives and their increased ownership of family property.  While there is an 
expectation that individual filing will influence behavior, we should also be 
aware that, according to one survey, the majority of British citizens are 
generally ignorant of the legal rights established by marriage.234  If British 
couples are also ignorant of their actions’ tax consequences, this lack of 
awareness would reduce the incentive effects of individual taxation. 
1. Employment of Wives 
As the 1986 green paper illustrated, Parliament assumed that wives would 
leave paid employment when they had children and that “the tax system should 
not discriminate against families where the wife wishes to remain at home to 
care for young children.”235  The government wanted to ensure that “[o]ne-
earner couples at all income levels would see their tax burden fall 
substantially.”236  This section questions whether individual taxation had its 
intended result or whether it increased wives’ paid employment in the U.K.—
an unintended consequence for Parliament and some within the Thatcher 
administration. 
There is an on-going academic debate whether individual taxation 
increases wives’ incentive to engage in paid employment.  Studies seek to 
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determine whether the income tax, either the tax unit or tax rates, significantly 
affects women’s employment decisions.237  One study conducted in Sweden 
found that individual taxation encourages wives to provide more paid labor.238  
A second study, on the other hand, shows that women in countries with joint 
income taxation exhibit no statistically significant difference in their labor 
force participation than women in countries with individual taxation.239  Yet 
another study concludes that, with individual taxation, “it is not safe to assume 
that labor supplies for different groups will change in the same direction.”240  If 
nothing else, the available evidence indicates that the issue of wives’ 
workforce participation is complex, and it is unlikely that significant societal 
disincentives will be eliminated by changing the tax unit. 
To date there is little research on the impact the adoption of individual 
taxation has had on British wives’ labor performance.  Because British wives 
previously had a separate exemption equal to that of a single person and the 
ability to be taxed separately on their earned income, economic disincentives 
were rare.  They occurred where husbands or wives were unwilling to use 
individual taxation for earned income or where the impact of losing the MMA 
was greater than the reduction from having income taxed in lower tax brackets.  
On the other hand, because wives’ exemptions are not transferrable, couples 
lose them if wives have no income; this should create some increased incentive 
for wives’ paid employment.  Similarly, non-economic disincentives were 
removed by the adoption of individual taxation.  Although fewer than 35% of 
British taxpayers file a return, for those who are married, individual taxation 
means that wives no longer need to report their income to their husbands, 
unless the sharing of information is necessary to determine the deductions and 
credits that are still calculated on combined incomes.241  But while individual 
taxation did create these additional incentives for wives to enter the work 
force, their effect was likely modest because the previous system in the U.K. 
was already relatively conducive to wives’ employment. 
The evidence that exists of British wives entering the paid labor force as a 
result of the change in the tax unit is inconclusive.  Married women in the U.K. 
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have relatively small labor supply elasticities that have not been substantially 
changed by individual taxation.242  Consistent with trends throughout Europe, 
as of spring 2004, 70% of British working-age women were employed, 
compared to 58% in 1984, and, as a result, the difference between the 
employment rate of men and women shrank from 19% in 1984 to 10% in 
2005.243  However, barely more than 60% of all British couples with children 
had two earners, and that number was only increased to 67% if there were no 
children.244  More troubling, studies find that these numbers hide underlying 
flaws in the labor market that might have been exacerbated by individual 
taxation.245  Of those couples with two earners, only 33.8% had both spouses 
working full-time and only 20.5% of couples with children under 15 had both 
spouses working full-time.246  Only 8% of women working part-time said they 
did so because they could not find full-time work; 74% said they did not want 
to work full-time.247 
Despite these feelings, part-time work is deleterious to women’s long-term 
economic position as it does not provide many of the economic rewards of full-
time employment, namely private pensions.  In fact, studies show women who 
engage in predominantly part-time work for thirty years or more are not in any 
better financial position than those who are economically inactive.248  And 
while the payoff of increased employment experience has risen for wives who 
work full-time, the pay penalty of part-time work has worsened.249  Therefore, 
it is important to note that the combination of individual taxation and the 
flattening of the tax brackets encouraged wives to enter into less well-paid, 
less-secure, part-time employment when, and if, they needed additional 
income.  These changes do not seem to have created the opportunities or 
motivation to seek out better paid, more secure, full-time alternatives. 
While in the last two decades British wives have primarily entered part-
time employment, there has nevertheless been a reaction against perceived 
governmental incentives for wives to enter the labor force.  Some blame the 
tax system for creating, or at least acknowledging, changing family structures: 
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Many see the new state libertarianism which has replaced [institutional support 
for the traditional family] not as a withdrawal of interference in private lives so 
much as the exercise of a new set of rules privileging a powerful interest 
group.  This perceived new elite, which has definite “meritocratic” features, 
consists of professional “two-career” couples, who are better off when taxed as 
independent workers, plus a growing entourage of fellow-travelling adult 
“singles” whose relative affluence is similarly promoted by fiscal policies 
treating “family life” as an individual lifestyle choice.250 
This backlash blames state policy for the fact that the nature of the family unit 
has changed.  Twenty-nine percent of all children born in 1991, the year after 
individual taxation became effective, were born outside of marriage and, in 
1991, 26% of households comprised just one person, compared with 17% in 
1971.251  We will have to wait to see whether individual taxation is blamed for 
changing family structures or celebrated for recognizing pre-existing social 
changes. 
Whether a change to individual taxation would produce similar results in 
the U.S. is uncertain.  In the post-World War II era, the U.S. also witnessed a 
growth in the percentage of wives entering paid employment.252  With 
individual taxation, one would expect a greater degree of responsiveness in the 
U.S. because American wives have no earned income exemption equivalent to 
the WEIA or the British right to be taxed separately on earned income.253  The 
greater economic incentive might be counter-balanced by the fact that women 
regard the U.S. joint return as less demeaning because both spouses, and not 
simply the husband, are required to file the couple’s tax return.  Changing the 
British tax unit removed blatant discrimination in the administration of its 
income tax and might have produced a sense of equality and individual 
empowerment among wives unlikely to be experienced in the U.S.  Therefore, 
the adoption of individual taxation in the U.K. might have had a larger 
psychological impact but less of an economic impact than a comparable 
change would have in the U.S. 
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At this time, only inconclusive evidence suggests American wives avoid 
entering the paid labor force because joint taxation imposes a higher tax 
burden on them as the secondary earner within married couples.254  For 
example, if we view the primary earner as earning a couple’s first dollar, 
thereby producing the income taxed in the couple’s lowest tax brackets, then 
the secondary earner’s first dollar of income would be taxed in the primary 
earner’s top tax bracket.255  But not all scholars agree that wives should be 
categorized as secondary wage earners.  Lawrence Zelenak, for example, 
argues that most couples do not have the economic luxury to categorize wives 
as secondary wage earners.256  Similarly, Dorothy Brown argues that this 
perspective of spouses’ roles is held mainly by upper-income white families.257 
Studies show that even among wives who are discouraged from working, 
the likelihood that joint taxation changes wives’ behavior is less true today as 
more wives enter the labor force.258  As of 2007, 57.6% of all married couples 
in the U.S. had two earners, and this is increasingly true for wealthier 
couples.259  Other conditions, and other tax implications, counteract the 
disincentives created by joint taxation.  A Congressional Budget Office report 
found that joint taxation leads the lower-earning spouse to work between 4% 
and 7% less than he or she otherwise would.260  Therefore, the increase in 
wives’ employment in the U.S. is not likely to be much greater than in the U.K. 
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Unfortunately, conclusions about the impact a change in tax unit will have 
on wives’ employment remain unsatisfying.  There is some evidence, but not 
much, that British wives have responded to individual taxation by engaging in 
paid employment; however, their new employment appears to be in part-time 
work that continues to offer few of the benefits that full-time employment 
provides.261  In the U.S., because fewer provisions exist to offset the 
disincentives of a secondary earner, there is likely to be a greater response to 
individual taxation unless the psychological impact of recognizing wives 
separately from their husbands was particularly large in the U.K.  Without 
knowing the magnitude of this psychological impact, it is difficult to 
extrapolate exactly how individual taxation would affect wives’ labor efforts in 
the U.S., other than to conclude it is unlikely to reduce them.  Based on the 
British experience, policymakers should not expect a massive new entry of 
wives into full-time employment upon the adoption of individual taxation.  
More study needs to be performed to see who has entered the paid labor 
market and, to the extent possible, what motivated their entry. 
2. Family Property Holdings 
Before 1985, it was estimated that over half of all British wives owned 
some investment property, held independently or jointly with their husbands.262  
With the adoption of individual taxation, that percentage of wives and the 
value of what they owned was expected to increase.263  Even Parliament 
expected families would react to individual taxation by shifting income 
between spouses in order to reduce couples’ collective taxes.264  In practice, 
this means that wealthier husbands should transfer investment property to their 
wives so that their wives could offset the income it generates with their 
exemption and pay tax on the remaining income in their lower tax brackets. 
This shifting of family property was expected to occur despite drawbacks 
for the wealthier spouse.  To be an effective transfer for British tax purposes, 
the transfer to the lower-income spouse must immediately divest the 
transferor’s beneficial interest and vest that interest either in the transferee or 
in a valid trust for the transferee’s benefit.265  As in the U.S., whether a person 
has sufficiently “given” property to another is a matter of intention and a 
question of fact.266  Unlike in the U.S., however, couples in the U.K. hold 
fewer easily transferred income-producing assets; more of a British family’s 
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wealth is held in its home, as opposed to, for example, stocks or bonds.267  
British courts are also reluctant to recognize gifts between spouses for fear that 
the intent is to put property beyond the reach of creditors.268  Therefore, 
transfers of income-producing assets should have a relatively greater impact on 
a higher-income British spouse, as compared to an American counterpart, as 
the British have fewer assets to transfer and must do so convincingly. 
The potential tax savings from this income shifting is widely known in the 
U.K. and can be obtained with no tax cost, although administrative costs will 
almost certainly be incurred.  In its manual on capital gains, the HMRC 
explains that a husband and wife or civil partners who are living together can 
transfer assets between themselves without triggering a capital gain or capital 
loss by completing, signing, and submitting a form indicating that there is a 
new owner of the property.269  With some planning and the right kinds of 
assets, couples can minimize their collective tax obligations.  This benefit is 
explained to couples in the popular press as “[t]he last remaining area where 
there is tax-favourable treatment for those who are married.”270 
One study has examined the shifting of family assets between spouses with 
different marginal tax rates since the adoption of individual taxation.271  This 
study found a sizeable shift in the incidence of taxable income; however, it 
also found that few couples shifted income to the optimal level.272  In other 
words, most couples left some tax dollars on the table.  Only 18% of couples 
shifted the optimal amount to the lower-income spouse if the husband’s tax 
rate was higher than the wife’s, and only 30% did so if the wife’s tax rate was 
higher.273  But while the study found that couples would not shift income to the 
maximum extent possible to secure a tax reduction, it did find an increase in 
three outcomes: the proportion of wives having any investment income; the 
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fraction of household investment income owned by wives; and the fraction of 
households in which the wife held all of the investment income.274  The 
authors concluded that a 10% differential in spouses’ marginal tax rates led to 
a 2.6% to 3.1% increase in the share of investment income allocated to the 
spouse with the lower marginal tax rate.275  This occurred despite the 
transaction costs of such re-allocations.276  Based on this study, individual 
taxation does increase the wealth, if not the earning power, of British wives. 
While transfers of income appear to benefit women, there are instances 
when women are, in fact, harmed.  British husbands can transfer to their wives 
interests with sufficient restrictions attached to secure income tax savings but 
without transferring control.277  Similarly, it is possible to give an interest in 
property that creates a joint ownership but not an equal ownership.278  
Nevertheless, the HMRC has created a default rule allowing spouses each to 
report 50% of the income of an asset held jointly regardless of actual 
ownership interests.279  Tax advisors understand the rule’s value for wealthy 
spouses: “This 50:50 rule is very useful if you wish to reduce you and your 
spouse’s overall tax liability, but also retain much of the control over the 
underlying assets.  You could put the assets in joint name, but only give away a 
5% share of the investments.”280  This can create situations where wives are 
taxed on income they do not own and over which they have no control, even as 
it produces lower collective tax burdens.  Although the author has found no 
cases to date, one can imagine that a spouse with such a 5% ownership interest 
but a 50% tax bill might object if the marriage ends in divorce.  At that point, 
individual taxation might not seem so wife-friendly. 
Similarly, family law might minimize the long-term impact of these tax-
driven inter-spousal gifts.  On one hand, in the event of a spouse’s death, 
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surviving spouses in the U.K. do not automatically receive all of their spouses’ 
property if there are other surviving relatives and, therefore, lower-income 
spouses might receive more total assets if they received part as inter vivos gifts 
from their higher-income mates.281  On the other hand, because the amount a 
wife is entitled to on the death of an intestate spouse is tied to her maintenance, 
this favorable result might not always occur.282  The earlier gift might simply 
reduce the amount a wife is entitled to on the death of her husband. 
In the event of divorce, the effect of these gifts might also be minimized as 
a result of the liberalization of divorce law.  Alimony and the division of 
family property are resolved in the U.K. in an application for ancillary relief 
after the divorce proceeding.283  Likened to the War of the Roses, British 
couples fight over ancillary relief, in part because there are no hard and fast 
rules about how assets should be divided.284  As described in the popular press, 
“When a married couple separates, all property – whether jointly owned or not 
– goes into one big pot of ‘marital assets’ to be divided up according to what 
the couple (and their lawyers) agree is fair.”285 
In the majority of divorce cases, British courts look at the financial need of 
the parties.286  For those couples with more than a minimum of assets, judges 
retain discretion as to the division of assets; however, there has been a 
movement to a presumption of equality.287  In 2000, in White v. White, the Law 
Lords stated that the starting position was an equal division of capital acquired 
during marriage, regardless of its ownership.288  If a spouse wants an unequal 
division of the matrimonial assets, that spouse must show that he or she made 
an exceptional contribution to their acquisition.289  Baroness Brenda Hale, in 
Miller v. Miller, concluded that it has become “less and less relevant to ask 
who technically is the owner of what.”290  Therefore, tax-driven gifts might 
also be accelerating the division that would ultimately be required by the 
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family court upon divorce with the higher-income spouse losing control (if 
control is given) before a divorce necessitates that outcome. 
The U.S. should experience similar, if not greater, instances of income 
shifting than have been witnessed in the U.K., similarly accelerating transfers 
on death or divorce.291  In the period before the adoption of the income-
splitting joint return, when the U.S. had an individual-based system, one 
commentator recognized that “[o]ne of the results of higher tax rates has been a 
burst of generosity on the part of prosperous husbands.”292  More troublesome 
for the tax system, many of those transfers worked for tax purposes but gave 
wives little more than tax liability.293  In one early case before the New York 
Court of Appeals, then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo complained that an 
assignment of a lease and the profits that it generated to a spouse was “to lower 
the plaintiff’s tax by taking income out of his return and adding it to the return 
to be made by his wife.  Beyond that, the relation was to be the same as it had 
been.”294  The difficulty of auditing these types of transactions and the 
resulting need to create default rules are as likely to trouble the U.S. as they do 
the U.K., and at least some American states will likely alter their marital 
property laws by adopting watered-down versions of community property 
laws, as they did before 1948, to permit a state-wide division of income 
without the need for individual devices.295  Because the author can only hazard 
a guess at political responses, transfers of income-producing property will 
likely happen in the U.S., but we cannot fully predict the extent to which 
property and control over that property will be shifted. 
The primary complicating factor for inter-spousal transfers, whether in the 
U.K. or the U.S., is that ownership and control issues within marriage are 
complex.  Tax laws that promise tax reduction are unlikely sources for 
producing true spousal equality in property ownership.  As with expected 
changes in wives’ paid employment, more information about the actual shifting 
of property, and confirmation that control as well as the tax obligation is being 
shifted, needs to be obtained before accurate calculations can be made about 
this consequence.  However, while dangers lurk and the results are difficult to 
quantify, it is clear that individual taxation, properly policed, does encourage 
the redistribution of property within marriage. 
 
 291. The author has found no research on the percentage of American wives holding property. 
 292. Robert M. Yoder, She’s Dear, But is She Deductible?, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Oct. 
12, 1946, at 17, 141. 
 293. See Randolph E. Paul & Valentine B. Havens, Husband and Wife Under the Income Tax, 
5 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 255 (1936). 
 294. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 549 (N.Y. 1928). 
 295. See McMahon, supra note 110. 
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B. Tax Avoidance 
The ability to shift income between spouses in different tax rate brackets, 
and thereby to reduce collective taxes, not only increases the relative economic 
position of British wives, but it also generates significant policing problems for 
the government.  To the extent the government desires that only substantive 
changes in ownership produce favorable tax results, it needs to review the 
substance of those transactions.  This policing requires costly effort and creates 
inequities between those caught devising sham transfers and those who 
manage to avoid detection.  British courts have already begun hearing cases in 
which the HMRC contends that family income shifting constitutes tax 
avoidance and, therefore, the desired tax reduction should be denied.296  This 
section examines these costs associated with inter-spousal income shifting. 
1. Unavoidable Complexity 
In the years leading up to the adoption of individual taxation, tax 
avoidance in the U.K. was increasing.297  Trying to negate that avoidance, the 
HMRC clawed back over £2 billion in unpaid taxes in 1988, compared to 
£1.68 billion in 1987.298  Yet experts concluded that the HMRC was barely 
scraping the surface of the tax-avoidance problem.299  The British government 
recognizes there is a gap between what people pay in taxes and what the 
government thinks they owe, estimated by the HMRC Revenue at £15 billion 
annually, but it is difficult for the HMRC to find this lost revenue because 
there are substantially fewer audits in the U.K. than in the U.S.300  It will 
require a substantial infusion of resources to make this auditing possible, in 
part because the British system is less efficient than its American 
counterpart.301  The HMRC’s administrative costs, for example, are about 2% 
of revenue collected, which is three or four times the comparable figure for the 
I.R.S.302 
While the U.K. recognizes that tax avoidance costs the government 
significant revenue, Parliament has nevertheless been slow to act.  If the 
government attempts to police marital income shifting in order to distinguish 
true transfers from shams or to assess the value of transferred interests, there 
will need to be a significant revision of the existing simple regime to a more 
 
 296. See, e.g., Jones v. Garnett, [2007] UKHL 35, (H.L.) [1]–[2] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 297. Peter Rodgers, Taxing Times for Fiddlers on the Hoof, GUARDIAN, Sept. 1, 1989, at 25. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, MEASURING TAX GAPS 2009 (2010); THURONYI, supra note 
21, at 213. 
 301. See Gale, supra note 36, at 349–50. 
 302. Id. at 350. 
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complex, American-style tax enforcement system.303  This flies in the face of 
current British theory and policy objectives.304  As discussed in Part I, the 
current British income tax has compromised in favor of simplicity even when 
it frustrates the goals of accurately measuring income or the ability to pay 
taxes.305  A statutory general anti-avoidance rule has been discussed but no 
action taken because the British government is unsure if this new complexity 
would be an improvement over tax avoidance.306  If there is increased tax 
avoidance as couples develop new ways to shift income for tax purposes, the 
U.K. will have a choice: either devote more resources to define and then police 
avoidance behavior or ignore the avoidance behavior. 
The British government has tried to use existing law to prevent the inter-
spousal income shifting that occurs through family businesses, but it has failed.  
The most notable case to date, Arctic Systems, resulted in a victory for married 
couples and a substantial loss for the HMRC.307  The final decision ended a 
seven-year standoff between the government and Geoff and Diana Jones, the 
husband and wife owners of a small IT consulting firm, Arctic Systems Ltd.308  
After being let go from his job, Geoff decided to go into business for himself 
in 1992, two years after individual taxation was established.309  On the advice 
of his accountants, the new company, owned equally by Geoff and Diana, paid 
Geoff and Diana salaries: Geoff’s was below market for consulting work, and 
Diana’s was for four or five hours per week of administrative and bookkeeping 
work.310  After expenses and the corporate tax were deducted, the couple 
received the remaining income as dividends, which under U.K. law still 
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 308. Jones, [2007] UKHL at [3]–[4]. 
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minimized income taxes and national insurance contributions.311  The 
government challenged this tax plan, arguing that Geoff never would have 
consented to transfer half of his business to a stranger under the same terms.312  
Attempting to apply a provision of a 1930 law intended to prevent transfers to 
minor children, the HMRC sought to tax all of the income generated by the 
business to Geoff individually.313 
The lower courts agreed with the HMRC, disallowing the tax advantage 
from this planning.314  On appeal, however, although the Law Lords believed 
that “[t]he decisions were tax driven and not commercially driven,” they 
concluded that the inter-spousal arrangement fell within the exemption 
provided for gifts between spouses.315  This dividend system had secured a 
16% tax reduction for the Jones, and this benefit applied to a large number of 
other couples’ dividend payment schemes.316  During one hearing, the taxpayer 
argued that at least 200,000 families were potentially at risk of having their 
tax-planning devices invalidated; the government countered that the number 
was really closer to 30,000.317  Regardless of how many couples stood to 
benefit, the Law Lords noted that gifts between spouses in the U.K. are not 
taxed, and these arrangements were, therefore, given tax effect.318  Small 
businesses rejoiced: the chairman of a group of such businesses hailed the 
decision as “the best Christmas present for the U.K.’s small family 
businesses.”319 
The government was not satisfied with this result, and HM Treasury 
sought its only recourse—to change the law.  Treasury issued a written report 
to Parliament in mid-2007, proposing broad rules that would affect many 
limited companies and partnerships.320  If two or more “connected persons,” 
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which includes spouses, are engaged in business and the income the business 
produces is divided in a manner that produces a tax advantage, the division 
could be recharacterized.321 
[T]he Government believes it is unfair for one person to arrange their affairs so 
that their income is diverted to a second person, subject to a lower tax rate, to 
obtain a tax advantage (income shifting).  The vast majority of individuals 
cannot shift their income and income shifting runs counter to the principle of 
independent taxation.322 
While the government indicated that it had no intention of attacking actual 
transfers between spouses, for example gifts of income-producing property, it 
found something fundamentally different in the business relationship of the 
Joneses.323  Any arrangement like this, it felt, “minimises [sic.] their tax 
liability, and results in an unfair outcome, increasing the tax burden on other 
tax-payers and putting businesses that compete with these individuals at a 
competitive disadvantage.”324  The Treasury then identified 85,000 small 
family-run companies and partnerships with arrangements similar to the 
Joneses.325  It estimated that the elimination of these arrangements would save 
£200 million in administrative costs and prevent a tax loss of £350 million by 
2010–2011.326  Moreover, the government estimated that as the number of 
small businesses continues to increase, there will be more of these 
opportunities to shift income.327 
Drafting a workable solution proved difficult, however.  There were many 
attacks on the Treasury proposal as business groups rallied for its defeat.  
Arguing that it would disadvantage family-run businesses and discourage 
people from entering into business with anyone, spouses or not, pro-business 
groups sought to protect the financial advantages individual taxation could 
 
Budget Report, HM TREASURY, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/prebud_index.htm (last visited 
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provide.328  The Professional Contractors Group, who helped fund the Arctic 
Systems litigation, would not accept the “income shifting” label, arguing that 
for some years the government itself had recommended that businesses be set 
up jointly.329  At least one pro-business organization “recognise[d] the 
Government’s concern, and [] accept[ed] that income-shifting is a legitimate 
area in which to seek policy changes where there is clear abuse”; however, it 
doubted that there was any “principled way of drawing a boundary between 
abusive and non-abusive tax planning in this area. . . .  There is no point at all 
in asking the owners of small businesses to self-assess whether arrangements 
of the type with which this proposed legislation is concerned are arm’s-
length.”330 
Illustrating the growing power of British interest groups, last minute 
lobbying prompted the Chancellor to postpone the rule changes in favor of 
more extensive consultation.331  Consequently, the final result after Arctic 
Systems remains uncertain.  As it stands, these dividend-sharing arrangements 
effectively reduce a couple’s collective income taxes while the government 
continues to consult on this issue.  Given the many other economic issues 
facing the U.K. today, the Treasury is unlikely to take action any time soon.  It 
did not bring forward legislation on this topic in the 2010 finance bill.332  The 
alternatives remain open: Parliament can pass a law moving to a more 
American-type, complex tax regime, allowing HMRC to police income-
shifting behavior in order to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether income 
has been unacceptably shifted by one spouse to gain a tax advantage, or 
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Parliament can allow Arctic Systems to stand and concede income shifting as 
couples desire.333 
For all of its more complicated tax regime, we should not assume that the 
American system will be in a significantly better position to limit this type of 
tax avoidance, particularly as there is the possibility that all transfers of 
property between spouses, many of which are accepted by the British 
government, will be viewed as avoidance in the U.S., as they are in Canada.  
Moreover, even if one concedes—although this author is reluctant to do so—
that the existing Internal Revenue Code could target every device wealthy 
spouses will use to shift taxable income, but not control over the underlying 
property, invalid transfers will still need to be caught.  The I.R.S. is struggling 
to restrain today’s tax avoidance and surely will have even more trouble with 
the detailed and complicated avoidance that might be perpetrated within 
couples.334  Facially-valid avoidance devices like income-shifting 
arrangements will be difficult to detect, much less successfully prosecute.  
Economic pressure placed on the I.R.S. to prioritize enforcement of certain 
matters has already reduced enforcement in areas ripe for exploitation by 
income shifting.335 
Perhaps more difficult to resolve, Congress will need to devise rules to 
reconcile individual taxation with the social provisions included in the 
American income tax.  For example, rules will need to be created to deal with 
the income phase-outs applicable to many deductions and credits.  To continue 
to base these tax expenditures on a family’s aggregate income will be difficult 
to administer, but to allow each spouse to calculate them separately would 
sometimes produce incongruous results.  Couples where the wealthy spouse 
refuses to, or is unable to, shift income to their lower-income spouse might 
enjoy tax benefits like the Earned Income Tax Credit, higher Child Care 
Credits, and more.  While this might be an intentional result, these 
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distributional and revenue effects should be included in our evaluation of 
individual taxation. 
A similar concern involves the allocation of such social provisions.  The 
British system has devised differing rules for allocating its various social 
provisions between spouses, although their administration should be easier 
because there are fewer such provisions in the U.K.’s tax.  The British 
Children’s Tax Credit, calculated on a couple’s combined income, is allocated 
to the spouse who has income in higher tax brackets.336  If neither spouse has 
income above the basic tax rate, they may share or allocate the credit as they 
desire.337  Similarly, before the mortgage interest deduction was repealed, the 
system allowed spouses to choose how to allocate it, providing even more 
flexibility.338  The deduction was not tied to which spouse actually paid the 
interest, although either spouse could withdraw their consent to the 
allocation.339  This flexibility is not available for all British credits.  The Blind 
Person’s Allowance must first be applied against the total of the blind person’s 
income before the excess can be transferred to a spouse or civil partner.340  
With many possible permutations of allocation available, American 
policymakers would have to decide whether to follow one of these paths for 
each credit or deduction granted. 
These issues will inevitably create additional complexities in the tax 
system as taxpayers attempt to use the system to reduce their own tax burdens.  
Both the U.K. and the U.S. already struggle with tax avoidance and, in light of 
individual taxation’s opportunities for increased avoidance, many of which 
will be substantial, evaluating the adoption of this regime should take into 
account the government’s and taxpayers’ logistical and financial constraints 
and responses.341  The U.K. has begun to recognize the difficulty of removing 
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tax benefits once they have been enjoyed.342  Unless the U.S. takes action to 
prevent similar results before it adopts individual taxation, it will be in no 
better position to eliminate the advantages once created, even as it struggles to 
devise new rules for the operation of existing tax policies. 
2. Ignoring Bad Behavior 
With individual taxation in place, the British government retains a choice, 
but one that it does not want to make.  It can police inter-spousal income 
shifting at the cost discussed above, or it can grant tax reduction to all—even 
incomplete and entirely tax-driven—transfers of property, either by issuing a 
directive to that effect or by simply ignoring the behavior.  This latter option 
would likely be based on the hope that existing rules prohibiting spouses, as 
connected persons, from engaging in certain obvious tax avoidance 
transactions are sufficient to police most avoidance behavior or that even 
purely tax-driven transactions will result in at least some property ending up in 
the hands of the nation’s wives.343  Parliament should be aware that if income 
shifting is permitted as a result of either of these approaches, it will have 
certain negative unintended consequences. 
First, even if the British population concludes that the beneficial 
consequences of income shifting should override all else, this tax avoidance 
will decrease the taxes paid by those engaging in income shifting by 
decreasing the collective taxes that these married couples owe.344  The British 
public is aware of this result as a strategy, but it is unclear whether they are 
aware of its larger implications.345  Married couples are openly advised to 
 
Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (arguing for a simplified tax system 
and considering why there is resistance to the idea). 
 342. James Chapman, Cameron: I Don’t Need a Coalition: Tories Would “Dare” Lib Dems 
to Vote Down Their Budget, MAILONLINE (May 3, 2010, 10:39 AM), http://www.daily 
mail.co.uk/news/election/article-1270459/David-Cameron-admits-facing-difficult-tough-
decisions-spending-cuts-plug-163bn-deficit.html (noting that on the eve of the last Prime Minister 
election, politicians were trying to reassure citizens that budget cuts would not remove tax credits 
for children, schools, or hospitals). 
 343. IN8—Rules that do Not Change, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/ 
manuals/inmanual/in8.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). 
 344. Individual taxation, to the extent it lowers the taxation of married couples and 
necessitates increases in tax rates, will disadvantage those in relatively greater need.  One-parent 
families, largely composed of women and children, constitute one of most rapidly-growing family 
types.  Hilary Winchester, Women and Children Last: The Poverty and Marginalization of One-
Parent Families, 70 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 70, 70 (1990).  In 
Britain this group is extremely marginalized.  Id. at 81.  In the U.S., individual taxation might 
deprive this group of existing head of household benefits. 
 345. The most troubling aspect of the Arctic Systems income shifting might be the conversion 
of wage income to dividends which allows former employees to minimize their contributions to 
the health care system.  CLAIRE CRAWFORD & JUDITH FREEDMAN, INST. FOR FISCAL STUD., 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
214 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:159 
decrease the amount they must contribute to the government by shifting 
property and the income it generates, but it is unclear whether people are aware 
that the combined result of these individual activities is estimated at £350 
million annually.346 
That income shifting decreases tax revenue also means that evidence of 
this behavior, even when the behavior is not undertaken for tax avoidance 
purposes, might become newsworthy.  In fact, the argument that all income 
shifting constitutes tax avoidance quickly proved valuable as political 
ammunition.  In May 1995, Labour seized upon news that leaders of the 
National Grid, the company that operates the national gas transmission system 
throughout Great Britain, “had avoided tax by transferring share options to 
their wives.”347  As Prime Minister Tony Blair told the House of Commons, 
“The only reason why they transfer it to their spouses is because the 
renumeration [sic] is paid by way of share options to avoid income tax.  That’s 
why they do it.  That’s the issue.”348  Similarly, Adam Inram, former Labour 
defense minister, earning more than £115,000 from outside business interests, 
recently made the news when he failed to declare a family firm that could be 
used in this manner to avoid tax.349  How the public perceives this form of 
avoidance, and the degree to which they are willing to accept it, will play a part 
in the amount of damage it might do to the tax system as a whole. 
The largest threat to the system might not be the revenue lost directly from 
income shifting but, instead, the publicity it receives which tacitly encourages 
other avoidance.  Scholars have warned that if tax avoidance becomes part of 
everyday life, it will erode the U.K.’s tax-compliant culture.350  As studies in 
other contexts have shown, the perception of widespread tax avoidance often 
reduces the compliance of taxpayers who were not previously engaging in tax 
avoidance because they begin to perceive the system as unfair.351  The U.S. 
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government has found evidence that publicity of wealthy taxpayers’ successful 
attempts to avoid their “fair share” of federal taxes undermines compliance 
throughout the income spectrum.352  When people believe that others have 
manipulated the income tax regime, normally compliant taxpayers are tempted 
to do so as well.353  The U.K. already has lower tax morale than does the U.S., 
so giving taxpayers additional motivation to avoid taxes could prove quite 
damaging.354 
These potential reductions in revenue, both directly and through the 
erosion of taxpayer compliance, will damage the U.K.’s budget if receipt of the 
tax revenue has been assumed.  In that case, the money will have to be found 
somewhere else, either by increasing taxes or by borrowing.  Neither option is 
attractive, particularly during this economic downturn.  To increase income tax 
rates will disproportionately affect those who choose not to, or are unable to, 
engage in tax avoidance.  Alternatively, Parliament could increase other taxes.  
The most likely candidates would be increasing the British VAT, recently 
raised to 20% effective in 2011, or by increasing excise taxes.355  These 
regressive taxes currently fund a quarter of the nation’s revenue.356  These 
alternatives will, in turn, produce new behavior of their own as taxpayers 
respond to the changing tax circumstances. 
Of course, this problem is not unique to the U.K. or to individual taxation.  
To the extent that any tax provision provides taxpayers means to reduce their 
individual burdens, it runs the risk of requiring that the government increase 
tax revenue from other sources.  The HMRC estimates that billions are lost 
every year because taxpayers evade the income tax; only part of that evasion 
comes from what the HMRC sees as impermissible income shifting.357  
Similarly, the U.S., without this opportunity for avoidance via income shifting, 
reports a $345 billion gross tax gap.358  Income shifting would likely increase 
this amount.  When the U.S. had individual taxation, President Franklin D. 
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Roosevelt reported that one family had established 197 trusts to divide family 
income and have it taxed at lower rates and that gifts were used to reduce a 
$100 million estate to $8 million two years prior to one man’s death.359  
Similarly, Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., 
complained that one resident of Baltimore, Maryland, established sixty-four 
trusts for his wife and three children and thereby saved over $485,000 in 
federal income taxes in one year.360 
On the other hand, individual taxation might decrease some costs of 
administering the American income tax.  If Congress uses the adoption of 
individual taxation as an opportunity to eliminate the innocent spouse rules that 
mitigate joint and several liability for those filing joint tax returns, it would 
save a significant amount of government revenue.361  After Congress 
liberalized innocent spouse relief in 1998, the Commissioner estimated that 
27,000 claims for relief were made the first year.362  In other years there have 
been as many as 57,000 claims.363  These claims must be reviewed and are 
often litigated.364  Innocent spouse relief was listed as one of the ten most 
litigated tax issues for 2010.365  These provisions thus command a considerable 
amount of government resources, even though taxpayers prevail even in part 
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only 38.9% of the time.366  These costs might be reduced, if not eliminated, 
with the switch to individual taxation.367 
This existence in the U.S. of potentially-offsetting financial benefits from 
individual taxation complicates the assessment of its impact on government 
revenue.  To the extent the change in tax unit decreases British or American 
government revenue, it has far-reaching and troubling consequences, many of 
which were not, and are not, considered during debates over the conversion to 
individual taxation.  As shown by this section, these unintended consequences 
are complex.  It is difficult to determine the full costs of these consequences in 
the U.K., and even harder to anticipate all of the ramifications in the U.S. of a 
change in law.  This Article is an attempt to begin identifying potential 
consequences in the U.S. because, despite the analytical difficulty, we must do 
so if we want to evaluate this proposal intelligently. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.K. has often provided examples to the U.S. of progressive policy 
development.368  From Britain’s earlier women’s movement to individual 
taxation, the U.S. can look across the Atlantic for a guide to changing many 
different types of laws.  Sometimes, however, the guidance is also a warning.  
The British experience with individual taxation, for example, provides a 
cautionary tale for the U.S.  There are significant complications and unfulfilled 
hopes that arise from the individual regime that need to be considered before 
changing the American tax unit.  This is true even if adopting individual 
taxation proves to be the best choice.  Individual taxation might afford a more 
complete sense of equality between the sexes, including reducing indirect 
sources of inequality, but it also provides a source of tax reduction for an 
already-benefited group.369  Only when these negative results are considered in 
conjunction with the expected benefits of the changed tax unit can 
governments accurately assess the value of altering the tax regime. 
The decision to adopt individual taxation is, therefore, more than a simple 
decision of whether or not marriage deserves recognition in the tax system.  
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Instead, it requires deciding how to allocate a tax reduction among various 
family types.  Unfortunately, when deciding the best tax unit, there is no 
choice that simply removes distortions in behavior.  Each choice always 
benefits some family arrangement.370  When the U.K. changed its tax unit, it 
expected to help one-earner families and encourage that family structure, and 
the new regime has provided many of its economic rewards to those families.  
If the U.S. has other goals—for example to provide economic rewards to two-
earner couples or to eliminate rewards based on marital status—it needs to 
draw lessons from the U.K.’s results.  The American government should not 
expect different results from similar actions.  If results similar to the British 
goals are the real intent, American voters should be forewarned. 
These repercussions of individual taxation do not seem to be getting 
sufficient examination or reevaluation in either country.  One reason might be 
the relatively weak position of wives in each society.371  Women today, as in 
the past, are seeking economic independence, and poverty remains a women’s 
issue.372  In 2009, American women were 35% more likely to be poor and 37% 
more likely to live in deep poverty than men.373  In the U.K, the Women’s 
Budget Group has identified British women as being disproportionately poor; 
in 2007–2008, women comprised almost 44% of taxpayers, but only 22% of 
taxpayers with total income over £30,000.374  Their representation declines at 
higher income levels.375  Thus, women’s economic independence in Britain 
does not seem to be increasing, and those seeking to help them might be 
willing to try almost any measure to change this. 
Although, as shown in this article, individual taxation is not a panacea to 
wives’ inequality, those who currently oppose the regime in the U.K. are doing 
so for reasons other than its unintended consequences.  Most objections to 
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individual taxation have been made by those advocating on other issues.  For 
example, some advocates of tax reduction advocate joint taxation as a means to 
lower tax rates.376  Similarly, the Chancellor has discussed replacing the family 
credit with an in-work low income tax credit to encourage paid employment, 
and it would likely mean a return to joint taxation after integrating the welfare 
and tax systems.377  These other concerns, though not unworthy of 
consideration, may someday bring the end of individual taxation without 
provoking vigorous debate over its value.  Much as individual taxation should 
only be adopted after considering the system’s adverse effects, the experiment 
should only be jettisoned after recognizing that its benefits will also be lost. 
Thus, deep thought needs to be given in both countries to the pros and cons 
of individual taxation, sooner rather than later.  The benefits and disadvantages 
of individual taxation might be clearer after a regime change has been made, 
but it is hard to overcome the inertia created once the new regime is in place.  
Evaluating other nations’ results might allow the U.S. more complete 
consideration without entrenching the policy itself.  As shown throughout this 
article, American policymakers should be considering a significant number of 
intended and unintended consequences likely to result from adopting 
individual taxation, not in the least because it will be hard to eliminate 
consequences that benefit a group of taxpayers once a new policy is enacted. 
If the U.S. wants to aid two-earner families, as most scholars claim to, the 
government might consider adopting individual taxation of earned but not 
unearned income, as operated in the U.K. before the 1988 legislative change.378  
This regime would be far from perfect and would impose administrative costs 
on taxpayers, create opportunities for abuse (although certainly not as many 
opportunities as with a completely individual-based system), and, as argued in 
the U.K., discriminate against wives who generate unearned income.  
Nevertheless, this bifurcated system would more narrowly target American 
scholars’ complaints than would a complete individual-based regime. 
While this Article has drawn many conclusions that policymakers should 
consider before adopting individual taxation, it leaves unanswered one 
significant question.  That is, why, as the U.K. continues its two decade-long 
experiment with the individual tax unit, the American government and its 
scholars have not examined the British experience when they debate changing 
the American tax unit.  Not only does it bode poorly for our consideration of 
this particular policy, but it also bodes ill for what we might be missing on 
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other issues by not looking at other nations as models.  We should be willing to 
learn from other nations’ successes and their mistakes. 
